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Article 
An Embedded Options Theory of 
Indefinite Contracts 
George S. Geis† 
Language is opaque, and people do not always state what 
they mean clearly. This presents an obvious problem for con-
tract law when courts must decide how to interpret an ambigu-
ous agreement. Should a judge pull out the dictionary, adopt a 
popular solution, impose a penalty term to encourage future 
parties to spell it out themselves, or do something else?1 
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and James Spindler for their valuable comments on an earlier draft, and I 
thank Ronen Avraham, Omri Ben-Shahar, Todd Henderson, and Chris 
Pietruszkiewicz for helpful conversations on the subject. This paper was pre-
sented at the 2005 annual meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law 
Schools and at the 2005 annual meeting of the Midwestern Law and Econom-
ics Association and benefited from feedback at these conferences. I am also 
grateful for the support of Dean Kenneth C. Randall, my faculty colleagues, 
and the Law School Foundation. Finally, thanks to Erica Nicholson for admin-
istrative help, and to Ron Andress, Jimmy Entrekin, Niccole Poole, and J.J. 
Thomas for outstanding research assistance. 
 1. A number of recent articles explore these, and other, approaches for 
interpreting ambiguous contracts. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, Implied Terms 
and Interpretation in Contract Law, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS 78, 78–99 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (examining 
the economic arguments with respect to textualism and contextualism in con-
tract interpretation); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Inter-
pretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994) (exploring ju-
dicial competence and interpretation of incomplete contracts from an 
analytical perspective); Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Sub-
stance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004) (proposing a 
framework within which parties can choose between form and substance in 
contract formation); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpre-
tation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (1997) (arguing that an 
inverted hierarchy of contract interpretation and supplementation better con-
forms to legal doctrine and judicial practice, the actual behavior of contracting 
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But before a court can even get to the interpretive ques-
tion, it must first decide whether a “real” contract exists. The 
indefiniteness doctrine maintains that when material terms to 
an agreement are too ambiguous or uncertain, there is a fatal 
problem, and the contract is void.2 The law cannot possibly find 
a binding agreement when contracts are riddled with holes like 
Swiss cheese. 
Courts have struggled to define the appropriate boundaries 
of the indefiniteness doctrine. While the common law tradition-
ally favored strict application of the doctrine,3 this approach 
has given way to a less formal one—echoing changes in other 
areas of contract law.4 Both the Uniform Commercial Code5 
 
parties, and important ethical and social considerations). The choice in con-
tract law between majoritarian default rules and penalty default rules is also 
relevant to the optimal interpretive approach. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gert-
ner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (describing the notion of penalty defaults); Eric 
A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or 
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 839–42 (2003) (linking interpretive approaches in 
contract law to the penalty default literature). 
 2. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.27 (4th ed. 2004) 
(describing the requirement of definiteness); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., 
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 38 (4th ed. 2001) (stating that no contract will exist, 
even if the parties intend to form a contract, when the terms lack sufficient 
definiteness and reasonable certainty); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND 
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.9, at 51 (5th ed. 2003) (“The traditional rule is 
that if the agreement is not reasonably certain as to its material terms there is 
a fatal indefiniteness and the agreement is void.”). The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts adopts the indefiniteness doctrine as follows: “Even though a 
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot 
be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are rea-
sonably certain.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §33(1) (1981). The 
rule finds justification in “the fundamental policy that contracts should be 
made by the parties, not by the courts.” Id. § 33(2) cmt. b. 
 3. See, e.g., Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Ky. 1964) (declining to 
enforce an agreement to renew a lease with terms to be fixed by “comparative 
business conditions”); Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823 (N.Y. 1916) (strik-
ing down an employment contract for a “fair share of my profits”). 
 4. On the evolution of indefiniteness doctrine in this manner, see infra 
Part I.B. More generally, the tension between formalism and realism in con-
tract law is famously described in GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 
(Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). Recently the same tension was explored 
in David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842 
(1999). 
 5. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2004) (“Even if one or more terms are left open, a 
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to 
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appro-
priate remedy.”). 
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and numerous commentators6 call for greater judicial gap fill-
ing and a scaled-back notion of indefiniteness. The goal is to 
support a person’s contractual intentions, even if this means 
more interpretive work for the courts.7 Conventional wisdom 
says that the indefiniteness doctrine is dead—or at least in its 
waning hours.8 
A recent empirical study by Robert Scott, however, finds 
the indefiniteness doctrine alive and well.9 During the five-year 
period ending in 2002, Professor Scott discovered 238 litigated 
decisions in state and federal courts involving indefinite con-
tracts.10 Indefiniteness played a major role in two-thirds of 
these cases, and the courts often voided contracts because an 
“agreement was too . . . uncertain [to be] legally []enforceable 
as a contract.”11 An updated search for the years 2003 and 2004 
 
 6. Support for active judicial gap filling takes root in both economic and 
philosophical approaches to contract law. The economic argument usually 
states that courts can save on transaction costs by filling gaps with commonly 
preferred terms. See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, 
and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 115, 116–18 (1993) 
(citing much of the literature on gap filling); Richard Craswell, Contract Law: 
General Theories, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 1, 
at 1, 1–2 (explaining that a set of presumptions or default rules may increase 
efficiency in contract drafting); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms In 
Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1061–64 (1992) (advocating for courts to en-
force open terms in contracts under certain circumstances). But see Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 1, at 93–95 (arguing that majoritarian gap filling is not 
necessarily the optimal economic approach). The philosophical argument for 
judicial gap filling suggests that respect for parties’ true intentions sometimes 
requires courts to resolve ambiguities. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS 
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 57–73 (1981) (stressing 
that gaps in contracts do not present a substantial problem, since the law can 
embrace gap-filling default principles). 
 7. A classic defense along these lines comes from Arthur Corbin. See AR-
THUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.1, at 528 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 
rev. ed. 1993) (explaining that “all modes of human expression are defective 
and inadequate,” and, as such, “the function of the court is to determine . . . 
the intention of the contracting parties and to give legal effect thereto”). 
 8. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (2003) (“Conventional wisdom holds that 
courts should (and do) strive whenever possible to fill contractual gaps with 
general standards of reasonableness and good faith.”). 
 9. Id. at 1643–44 (“[D]espite widespread academic support for more judi-
cial gap filling, the indefiniteness doctrine lives on in the common law of con-
tracts. In literally dozens of cases, American courts dismiss claims for breach 
of contract on the grounds of indefiniteness . . . .”). 
 10. Id. at 1652. 
 11. Id. at 1653. In cases where indefiniteness was a central issue, the 
courts annulled approximately 60 percent of the contracts under the indefi-
niteness doctrine. More specifically, Professor Scott chose a random sample of 
GEIS_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:31:43 AM 
2006] EMBEDDED OPTIONS 1667 
 
yields an additional 118 cases invoking the indefiniteness doc-
trine.12 It is hardly dead. 
This evidence presents a puzzle: why do indefinite con-
tracts remain common when courts continue to toss them out? 
Parties apparently fail to make specific agreements even when 
it would be easy to do so.13 Important, detailed terms or verifi-
able metrics, for example, could have been added at a low cost 
into many of the contracts that Professor Scott studied.14 Given 
the still-present risk of nonenforcement under the indefinite-
ness doctrine, we might expect parties to state their contractual 
intentions more clearly. 
So why do people agree to vague contracts in light of the 
indefiniteness doctrine? 
Scholars have offered several theories. Richard Posner, 
among others, has recently suggested that indefinite contracts 
result from efforts to minimize transaction costs.15 Parties do 
not have the time or budget to spell out every issue in detail, 
and it may be rational for them to leave some terms ambigu-
ous—to be sorted out through later negotiation or litigation, if 
 
137 cases for detailed analysis from the 238 state and federal cases involving 
the indefiniteness doctrine during this time period. From this sample, 48 cases 
only touched on the indefiniteness doctrine peripherally (for example, the 
courts may have mentioned the indefiniteness requirement in prefatory lan-
guage). Id. at 1652. In the other 89 cases directly raising the enforcement is-
sue, the courts struck down the contracts for indefiniteness 55 times. Id. at 
1652–53. This works out to a 61.8 percent incidence of invalid indefiniteness. 
 12. I replicated Professor Scott’s search for 2003 and 2004 by searching 
Westlaw’s 95k9(1) database “Contracts: Requisites and Validity: Nature and 
Essentials in General: Certainty as to Subject Matter: In General.” I included 
all state and federal courts in the search. My analysis of these cases is consis-
tent with Professor Scott’s work—suggesting that courts continue to annul 
contracts under the indefiniteness doctrine with great frequency. See infra 
notes 105–07 and accompanying text. I caution the reader, however, not to 
generalize too broadly from these case reports due to sample-selection biases. 
 13. See Scott, supra note 8, at 1660 (“This behavior appears directly in-
consistent with the assumption[ ] of contract theory that parties will . . . con-
tract over verifiable terms that can be specified at low cost.”); Robert E. Scott 
& George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE 
L.J. 814, 818 (2006) (suggesting that parties may “replac[e] precise provisions 
with vague terms” when doing so may reduce the cost of future litigation); 
George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the 
Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2002) 
(“[C]ontracts are often less complete than verifiability would allow.”). 
 14. See Scott, supra note 8, at 1657–60. 
 15. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpre-
tation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1587 (2005) (discussing the relationship between 
transaction costs and judicial gap filling). 
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it comes to that.16 All contracts are indefinite, in this sense, in 
the same way that all contracts are incomplete: it is impossible 
to specify every future contingency.17 But this cannot explain 
why parties leave out fundamental terms of the agreement 
when low-cost, verifiable metrics exist. 
A second possible explanation for indefinite contracts is 
that parties do not really care whether the contract is legally 
binding because they will rely on self-enforcement or private 
ordering instead.18 This may be particularly true if the parties 
enjoy a long-term commercial relationship in a close community 
where a good reputation, or profits from future deals, outweigh 
immediate breach.19 But this is likely to be just a small portion 
of the total contracting population because many indefinite con-
 
 16. See id.; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS 211–17 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining why contracting parties might choose to 
leave gaps deliberately); Cohen, supra note 1, at 81 (stating that “the costs of 
contractual completeness . . . often exceed the benefits,” and, as such, an in-
complete contract may be an efficient contract); Oliver Hart & John Moore, 
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1988) 
(underscoring the difficulty drafters face in anticipating all conceivable con-
tingencies); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, 
and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 543–
44 (1998) (arguing that the lower the probable occurrence of the contingency, 
the lower the probable benefit of including the term in the contract). 
 17. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 211–14; STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 299–301 (2004); Craswell, su-
pra note 6, § 400, at 1; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and 
the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 594–95 (2003). 
 18. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational 
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1115–16 (1981) (“[T]he self interest of both 
contracting parties will induce them to seek out [terms] that represent[ ] the 
optimal tradeoff between expected cost of contractual governance and profits 
forgone because the ideal output . . . is not enforced perfectly.”); Robert E. 
Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 
2039–42 (1987) (explaining the nature and scope of self-enforcing agreements); 
Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177, 183 (1985) 
(“[C]ontract execution goes efficiently to completion because [some] promises 
. . . are . . . self-enforcing.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Indus-
try: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 1724, 1745–62 (2001) (describing the origin and significance of relation-
ship-based remedies); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogene-
ous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 349 (1981) (discussing the personalistic exchange relations arising 
in the absence of a developed legal framework); Barak D. Richman, Firms, 
Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Or-
dering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004) (describing the role of reputation-
based private ordering). 
GEIS_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:31:43 AM 
2006] EMBEDDED OPTIONS 1669 
 
tracts involve one-off transactions between relative strangers.20 
Another, more satisfying, explanation for the endurance of 
vague contracts is needed. 
The thesis of this Article is that indefinite contracts are 
sometimes created because an imprecise term—combined with 
judicial willingness to fill gaps—can generate an embedded op-
tion.21 In other words, each party may think that the deal can 
be performed, at a minimum, by complying with the vague 
term in a manner favorable to the other side.22 But there is also 
a chance that one side will be able to secure his preferred in-
terpretation of the vague term through persuasion or litiga-
tion—especially under the current trend toward a loose indefi-
niteness doctrine and greater judicial gap filling.23 This 
possibility can be viewed as an embedded option, which the 
party may seek to exercise if future uncertainties play out in a 
particular way. 
To see how the embedded option is created, consider a con-
tract between two people for the sale of “chicken” that does not 
 
 20. Professor Scott’s empirical work, for example, revealed that two-thirds 
of the contracts struck down for indefiniteness involved one-time interactions 
between relative strangers. See Scott, supra note 8, at 1660 n.88. He suggests, 
however, that the domain of self-enforcing contracts may be greater than pre-
viously thought because parties may be motivated by a behavioral sense of re-
ciprocal fairness. Id. at 1661–63. 
 21. An embedded option is an opportunity, but not an obligation, to act in 
the future as new information emerges related to outcomes that are uncertain 
today. Unlike financial options, embedded options are not detailed in a con-
tract; they must be identified and specified. See JONATHAN MUN, REAL OPTION 
ANALYSIS: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR VALUING STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS 
AND DECISIONS 111–12 (2002) (describing various types of financial options); 
Timothy A. Luehrman, Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 89, 89–99. Embedded options are defined and dis-
cussed more fully infra Part II.A. 
 22. Professor Omri Ben-Shahar has recently suggested that courts should 
adopt an approach to the indefiniteness doctrine consistent with—but limited 
to—this belief. See Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in 
Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 402–03. He argues 
that instead of taking an all-or-nothing approach to indefiniteness, courts 
should allow parties to enforce an indefinite contract so long as they are will-
ing to accept terms favorable to the other side. Id. at 411–14. Courts would, 
however, not allow plaintiffs to have their preferred term govern the indefinite 
contract. This approach offers a possible solution to the problems explored in 
this Article, and I return to Professor Ben-Shahar’s intriguing suggestion infra 
Part III.B. 
 23. This Article thus builds on recent work by Professors Scott and Trian-
tis suggesting that “much of contract design can be improved by anticipating 
carefully the effect of the course of litigation on contract terms.” Scott & Trian-
tis, supra note 13, at 822. 
GEIS_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:31:43 AM 
1670 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1664 
 
specify the quality of fowl to be delivered.24 The buyer plans to 
resell the birds but faces an uncertain demand. She may view 
this vague contract as conferring, at a minimum, the right to 
buy low-quality chicken. In addition, she enjoys an embedded 
call option—there is a chance that she can enforce the contract 
to get high-quality chicken.25 And, importantly, she can decide 
whether to incur the costs of exercising the option after she 
gets new information on the poultry-market outlook.26 There is 
measurable value to holding this option on high-quality 
chicken, which is a function of the length of the contract, the 
volatility of her chicken valuations, and several other factors.27 
Flipping the analysis, the seller may similarly view the con-
tract as conveying the right to deliver high-quality chicken at 
the stated price, along with the possible option of enforcing the 
contract for low-quality chicken. 
It is important to recognize that the price—or even the 
creation—of an embedded interpretive option may not be fully 
appreciated by both parties. When an indefinite contract is 
formed, the option seller (which, as will become apparent, could 
be either party to the contract)28 is forced to write the option at 
a price that depends on characteristics of the option buyer.29 
 
 24. This example draws upon the famous contract interpretation case of 
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 
116, 121 (D.C.N.Y. 1960) (determining whether a contract to sell “chickens” 
referred to plump, young chickens or old, grizzled ones, id. at 120–21). The 
problem in that case differs from the one contemplated by this Article—how to 
interpret a valid contract, not whether to find one—but the facts serve as a 
nice example of how vagueness can create options. 
 25. Unlike a traditional call option, the buyer in this example does not 
have an absolute right to purchase high-quality chicken in the future. But if 
she pays the option exercise price—the cost of persuasion or litigation—then 
she does have a chance of securing high-quality chicken under the contract. So 
a better analogy might be an investor who purchases a call option that confers 
a chance of purchasing the underlying stock upon payment of the exercise 
price. 
 26. The entire analysis assumes, of course, that the contract takes place 
over time and is not an immediate spot transaction. 
 27. Five variables are typically used to calculate option value: the value of 
the underlying asset, the volatility of the underlying asset, the time to matur-
ity, the risk-free interest rate, and the exercise price. MUN, supra note 21, at 
149–50; see also infra note 111. 
 28. See infra Part II.B. 
 29. Cf. Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Ap-
proach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 175 (1990) (“When a lawsuit is filed, the de-
fendant is forced to write litigation options at prices that depend on the plain-
tiff ’s cost of pursuing the suit . . . . It is possible, therefore, that a defendant 
will be forced to write options whose value significantly exceeds the plaintiff ’s 
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Although the option may arguably be considered an implicit 
deal between the parties to trade risk, in the real world the op-
tion seller may be unlikely to recognize the option or have the 
information necessary to price the option appropriately. As a 
result, some people who get an option through vague language 
likely get it for free—or at a bargain rate—even though it im-
poses real costs that the other party would not have accepted 
without an adjustment elsewhere in the contract terms. 
Given these cognitive limitations, this Article will argue 
that embedded interpretive options can be problematic from an 
economic point of view.30 For example, if the option value to a 
buyer is sufficiently large—and ignored or underpriced by the 
seller—then the seller may contract to sell too much of a good. 
In other words, the price that the seller “really” receives might 
fall below his cost to produce. Or, conversely, a buyer may ig-
nore an embedded option garnered by a seller and purchase a 
product even though the price that the buyer “really” pays ex-
ceeds her valuation. Similarly, these options may lead to ineffi-
cient contract-related investments that do not fully take into 
account the likelihood of performance or the cost of breach. Ag-
gressive gap filling and further erosion of the indefiniteness 
doctrine thus has an underexplored cost: it may lead to distor-
tions that allocate resources inefficiently. 
This Article develops the embedded options theory of in-
definite contracts in three parts. Part I briefly reviews the in-
definiteness problem, assesses existing theories for why indefi-
nite contracts occur, and explores current solutions to the 
problem. Part II analyzes indefinite contract terms through the 
embedded options lens and looks at the impact of these options 
on efficient trade and investment decisions. Finally, Part III 
considers the implications of this theory for the law’s treatment 
of the indefiniteness doctrine. The Article argues that the right 
solution cannot embrace an overly formal approach that avoids 
plugging gaps entirely—all agreements retain some ambiguity. 
But recent zeal to fill gaps may be excessive, and a better ap- 
 
 
purchase price.”). 
 30. Cf. Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Con-
tracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 527–28 (1981) (demonstrating that even 
noncontract law solutions cannot completely guard against opportunism); 
Posner, supra note 16, at 565 (discussing some strategies an opportunistic 
party might employ to take advantage of an indefinite contract). 
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proach might involve “pro-defendant gap fillers”31 which only 
permit parties to enforce indefinite contracts with terms favor-
able to the other side. Another plausible approach would focus 
directly on the underlying reason for indefiniteness and 
whether parties have made sufficient investments in contrac-
tual specificity. Unfortunately, the fact-specific nature of these 
inquiries means that a bright-line rule for indefiniteness is 
unlikely to be very helpful. A brief conclusion summarizes the 
Article’s claims. 
I.  THE INDEFINITENESS PROBLEM 
Near the end of 1995, David Chase, a rising television pro-
ducer, flew from Los Angeles to New Jersey to research mafia 
activity.32 He wanted to flesh out an idea for a television show 
centering around “a mob boss in therapy.” The concept would 
ultimately expand into the wildly successful HBO program The 
Sopranos. 
Upon landing in New Jersey, Chase was ushered around 
by a man named Robert Baer, whom he had met earlier that 
year.33 Baer, a former prosecutor now aspiring to make movies, 
introduced Chase to a number of police detectives and mafia 
aficionados.34 Chase listened to their stories about criminal 
plotting and gang intrigue—some of which would later feature 
on episodes of The Sopranos.35 They toured mob hang-outs in 
New Jersey to scout filming locations. And a bit later, Baer also 
read and commented on drafts of Chase’s scripts.36 
Chase repeatedly offered to compensate Baer for his help, 
stating bluntly “you help me; I pay you.”37 But Baer would not 
accept any money up front, always countering that he would 
perform the services for free and take payment only if the show 
became a success.38 Finally, they agreed verbally that if this 
happened, “Chase would ‘take care of ’ Baer, and ‘remunerate  
 
 
 
 31. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 22, at 411–20. 
 32. Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 613 (3d Cir. 2004); Baer v. Chase, No. 
CIV.A.02-CV-2334(JA, 2004 WL 350050, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2004). 
 33. Baer, 392 F.3d at 613. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 613 & n.1. 
 36. Id. at 613. 
 37. Id. at 614. 
 38. Id. 
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Baer in a manner commensurate to the true value of [his ser-
vices].’”39 In actuality, Chase went on to make The Sopranos 
without further help from Baer, the show was a financial 
blockbuster, and Chase never paid Baer a dime.40 Baer sued to 
enforce the alleged contract in federal court. 
To Baer’s disappointment, however, both the District Court 
of New Jersey and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
his claim that the verbal agreement created a binding con-
tract.41 It was too indefinite. As the appeals court explained, 
“‘an agreement so deficient in the specification of its essential 
terms that the performance by each party cannot be ascer-
tained with reasonable certainty is not a contract.’”42 In this 
case, the agreement was too indefinite for at least four reasons: 
it did not set Baer’s compensation or provide a manner for de-
termining his compensation;43 it did not specify the meaning of 
the show’s “success”;44 it did not state whether the reward 
would come in cash, a screenwriting job, or some other form;45 
and it did not contemplate commencement and termination 
dates.46 Baer begged the courts to “plug gaps” and “‘clarify [the] 
ambiguities’ in the alleged contract,” but they refused to do so, 
and he lost the case.47 
As Baer v. Chase illustrates, the indefiniteness doctrine is 
a fundamental notion of contract law. There is a fatal problem 
when material terms are too indefinite, and the contract is 
void.48 Or more accurately, there is no contract at all. According 
to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, an offer “cannot be 
accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the con- 
 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Baer v. Chase, No. CIV.A.02-CV-2334(JA, 2004 WL 350050, at *6–8 
(D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2004), aff ’d 392 F.3d 609. 
 42. Baer, 392 F.3d at 619 (quoting Lo Bosco v. Kure Eng’g Ltd., 891 F. 
Supp. 1020, 1025 (D.N.J. 1995)). 
 43. Baer, 2004 WL 350050, at *6. 
 44. Id. at *7. 
 45. Id. For example, compensation under the agreement might come in 
the form of a screenwriting job for The Sopranos instead of dollars. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at *8. Baer might have recovered the fair value of his services un-
der a quasi-contract theory, but the statute of limitations may have barred 
that claim. Baer, 392 F.3d at 621–26 (remanding the issue to the lower court). 
 48. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.27; MURRAY, supra note 2, 
§ 38(A); PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9. 
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tract are reasonably certain.”49 You cannot bargain to sell 
something for $500 and expect a court to uphold this agreement 
as a real contract. 
And the intuition behind this rule should be obvious. How 
can a court possibly know whether a breach has occurred when 
an agreement is exceptionally vague? While it is often possible 
to fill gaps with reasonable terms, this fiction can eventually go 
too far. As one judge put it, “There is a point . . . at which inter-
pretation becomes alteration.”50 Courts are reluctant to make 
contracts for parties or to introduce important terms that they 
omit.51 
The problem, of course, is deciding whether a contract is 
too vague—such that it must be annulled—or whether it can be 
interpreted and affirmed by the court.52 Is an agreement to 
stitch a tailor-made suit for $500 void because the parties do 
not specify the fabric?53 A contract for a Chevy truck where the 
color and engine size are unspecified?54 How about a deal to 
build “a first-class hotel” and operate it in a “first-class man-
ner?”55 Vagueness is a matter of degree. As we shall see, views 
on the correct scope of the indefiniteness doctrine have ebbed 
and flowed over the past century.56 But first, to put the problem 
in perspective, it is helpful to examine why parties might write 
an indefinite contract. 
 
 49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1981). 
 50. Mellon Bank N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
 51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2), cmt. b; FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 2, § 3.28. 
 52. A different but closely related problem is whether vague expressions 
of assent between the parties lead to any agreement at all. This problem raises 
a number of important concerns related to precontractual obligation. See, e.g., 
Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
481 (1996); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Prom-
issory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249 (1996). But 
the topic I focus on here is different: once a vague agreement has been formed, 
should it be enforced through judicial interpretation or voided under the in-
definiteness doctrine? 
 53. See Factor v. Peabody Tailoring Sys., 187 N.W. 984, 984–85 (Wis. 
1922) (answering the question in the affirmative). 
 54. See Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 588 P.2d 939, 942 
(Idaho 1978) (deeming the agreement legally binding). 
 55. See Hart v. Ga. R.R. Co., 28 S.E. 637, 637–38 (Ga. 1897) (voiding the 
contract under the indefiniteness doctrine). Farnsworth offers plenty of other 
good examples. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.28. 
 56. See infra Part I.B. 
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A. WHY PARTIES WRITE INDEFINITE CONTRACTS 
1. Economize on Transaction Costs 
One plausible reason why parties fail to contract with 
greater specificity is that forming an agreement is costly.57 It 
may not be worth investing much time to spell out specific 
terms for routine transactions. And even when a contract in-
volves a great deal of money or complexity, there will still be 
low-probability events that are not worth dickering over.58 The 
parties may rationally choose not to address the contingency at 
all—silence being a form of indefiniteness—or they may decline 
to state specific terms and metrics if they do reference a remote 
event. In this sense, transaction costs ensure that all contracts 
are indefinite in the same way that all contracts are incom-
plete. 
This presents a possible concern, however, because it sug-
gests that parties can externalize the costs of contract forma-
tion to the courts.59 Instead of taking the time and expense to 
describe what a “first-class hotel” looks like, for example, the 
parties may rely on a judge to fill in the blanks and reach a 
good-enough outcome if they cannot work it out themselves. 
Commentators have justifiably questioned whether courts 
should be forced to take on this task.60 Why let private parties 
push contracting costs to a publicly funded judiciary? Smart 
judges have full dockets, and it might be better to adopt an ex-
pansive, or formal, use of the indefiniteness doctrine so the law 
forces parties to spell out what their contract means.61 
 
 57. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 211–17; Ayres & Gertner, 
supra note 1, at 92–93; Cohen, supra note 1, at 81. 
 58. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 17, at 594–95. 
 59. The general notion that parties may inappropriately shift contracting 
costs to the judiciary dates back, at least, to Lon Fuller’s work on formalities 
in contract law. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. 
REV. 799 (1941). More recent views on this topic can be found in Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 1, at 123–27; Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default 
Rules in Contract Law 10, Univ. of Chi., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working 
Paper No. 237 (2d Series), 2005, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=690403 
(“[T]here is no doubt that in a simple economic model, the parties have an in-
centive to externalize their costs on courts. One way of doing so may be to 
leave gaps in their contracts in the expectation that courts will fill them prop-
erly in case there is a dispute.”). 
 60. E.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 123–27 (using the argument to 
justify penalty default rules that force parties to spell out contracts in more 
detail). 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 93 (suggesting that penalty defaults reduce adjudica-
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On the other hand, this may not get us very far because 
parties surely cannot be expected to state every term with per-
fect precision. Remember that contingencies are often remote, 
language is clumsy, and time is short. So the interesting ques-
tion, even for formalists, remains: when does a contract pass a 
threshold of indefiniteness that should preclude it from becom-
ing a legally binding agreement? 
In a recent article, Richard Posner takes on this question 
with economic rigor, suggesting that courts should sometimes 
enforce vague contracts to strike an efficient balance between 
ex ante negotiation and ex post litigation.62 Judge Posner states 
up front that the goal of a legal system should be “to minimize 
contractual transaction costs, broadly understood as obstacles 
to efforts voluntarily to shift resources to their most valuable 
use.”63 A helpful way to look at the problem, then, might be to 
model the components that make up the transaction costs of 
contracting. 
Judge Posner divides contracting costs into two stages.64 
Stage-one costs come when the initial contract is drafted, as the 
parties determine what the contract should say. Stage-two 
costs come when a vague or missing term leads to legal dispute, 
and the parties pursue adjudication. Judge Posner claims that 
rational parties will not spell out all contract terms in stage 
one—but will instead trade off stage-one formation costs 
against stage-two litigation costs.65 The optimal specificity of a 
 
tion costs); Posner, supra note 59, at 10; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 17, at 
608 (“Default rules have proved too expensive for large heterogeneous econo-
mies.”). Eric Posner offers another straightforward approach: just charge par-
ties more to use the courts in this manner. Posner, supra note 59, at 10. 
 62. Posner, supra note 15, at 1583–84. 
 63. Id. at 1583; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 214 (suggest-
ing that a key “purpose of contract law is to minimize transaction costs of ne-
gotiating contracts by supplying efficient default terms and regulations”). 
 64. Posner, supra note 15, at 1583–84; see also Scott & Triantis, supra 
note 13, at 822–39. The literature actually hints at a third classification of 
contracting costs: investments that take place postformation, but prelitigation, 
as parties try to resolve the dispute themselves. This might include persua-
sion, threats, renegotiation, and the like. Posner, supra note 15, at 1614. As 
with previous work, however, I collapse the analysis of postformation behavior 
into just one step of persuasion and litigation. A more thorough analysis might 
examine the compound options that arise from indefinite terms: the option to 
invest in persuasion, the option to invest in litigation, and so on. The greater 
flexibility and piecemeal investment afforded by a compound analysis would 
increase the value of any embedded option. See Cornell, supra note 29, at 184–
86. 
 65. Posner, supra note 15, at 1584. 
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contract is thus a function of several variables, including for-
mation costs, the probability of litigation (itself a function of 
stage-one formation costs), the costs of litigation (to both the 
parties and the judiciary), and the cost of error (the possibility 
that the court will misinterpret the contract).66 
In short, Judge Posner’s work suggests that parties will 
implicitly or explicitly weigh the gains from investing in speci-
ficity now against the possibility of sorting out disputes from 
vagueness later. The normative implication is that some vague 
contracts should be enforced; a formalist approach requiring 
that parties “do whatever is necessary” to avoid ambiguity is 
inefficient.67 An extended argument might claim that courts 
should enforce vague contracts when, and only when, parties 
have made efficient tradeoffs between stage-one formation costs 
and stage-two litigation costs.68 
Yet empirical work by Robert Scott questions whether 
Judge Posner’s theory accurately explains how parties ap-
proach contract formation.69 In 2003, Professor Scott built and 
analyzed a database of all litigated cases involving the indefi-
niteness doctrine for a five-year period. Nearly two-thirds of the 
contracts were struck down for indefiniteness70—and the par-
ties often failed to write definite contracts even when it would 
have been easy to invest in greater specificity for material 
terms.71 Apparently, just a few of these cases resulted from in- 
 
 
 
 66. Id. at 1583–84. 
 67. Judge Posner puts it this way: “[T]he object of judicial enforcement of 
contracts is to minimize the sum of [stage-one formation and stage-two litiga-
tion] costs—rather than . . . insist that parties do whatever is necessary at the 
first stage to minimize the likelihood of litigation.” Id. at 1584. 
 68. Judge Posner does not explicitly extend his argument to make this 
point, but it might be deemed a plausible implication of his work. See id. at 
1583–84, 1587–89. I take up a form of this argument infra Part III.C. 
 69. Scott, supra note 8. 
 70. Id. at 1652–61. Professor Scott’s methodology and results are de-
scribed supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. Interestingly, it appears that 
the distinction between valid and invalid contracts in the cases that Professor 
Scott analyzed did not depend on whether the U.C.C. was involved or whether 
the dispute arose in a pro-gap-filling state. Scott, supra note 8, at 1652–54. 
Rather, the outcome may have turned on whether the court believed that the 
parties fully exploited verifiable metrics that could have easily been brought 
into the contract. Id. at 1654–55. In other words, the normative claim that in-
efficiently low investment in specific terms at the formation stage should in-
validate the contract may enjoy positive support in the case law. 
 71. Scott, supra note 8, at 1657. 
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advertence or carelessness; it seems that most of the parties de-
liberately chose to keep their contracts vague.72 
The real puzzle comes from Professor Scott’s observation 
that “parties [often] failed to incorporate in their agreements 
readily available, verifiable measures of performance.”73 For 
example, one common fact pattern involves an employment 
contract where the parties fail to spell out a bonus term clearly. 
They might easily state a formula for determining the bonus—
and the specific performance benchmarks required to earn the 
bonus—but fail to do so. Other deals studied by Professor Scott 
also seem to be kept deliberately vague,74 and my analysis of 
more recent cases supports this finding.75 
Or to use Judge Posner’s terminology, it seems that parties 
sometimes fail to make efficient investments in stage-one for-
mation costs. Certainly some contracts are indefinite only be-
cause the transaction costs of writing detailed terms are not 
worth it. But the question remains: why do a subset of parties 
intentionally keep their contracts vague even when it is easy—
and presumably efficient—to include a more precise term that 
would satisfy the indefiniteness doctrine? 
 
 72. Id.; see also Triantis, supra note 13, at 1067 (“The apparent willing-
ness of commercial parties to agree to vague terms is puzzling.”). 
 73. Scott, supra note 8, at 1657. This riddle is also reflected in the eco-
nomic literature on optimal contract design. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim & 
Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. 
ECON. REV. 902, 902 (1998) (“[O]ne also frequently observes contracts that 
seem ‘excessively’ incomplete . . . mak[ing] actions less sensitive to verifiable 
events than would seem optimal . . . [and] fail[ing] even to specify verifiable 
obligations of the parties.”). 
 74. Scott, supra note 8, at 1657. 
 75. Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 2004), discussed supra notes 32–
47 and accompanying text, is perhaps one example. Other illustrative cases 
where courts seize upon an apparently conscious failure to include verifiable 
metrics for material terms include Imi Norgren, Inc. v. D & D Tooling Manu-
facturing, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (voiding a settlement 
agreement because the security term was too indefinite since “[a]ll that was 
agreed to was that the payment was to be secured in some fashion [but] [n]o 
other terms were spelled out”); Botterbusch v. Preussag International Steel 
Corp., 609 S.E.2d 141, 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (“[A]lthough various parties 
discussed [plaintiff ’s] supplemental retirement package, no meeting of the 
minds was reached as to what this package would include.”); Goldstein v. 
Miles, 859 A.2d 313, 329 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (striking down an agree-
ment to sell a law firm for “below market value” because it “did not contain 
any material terms of the sale such as purchase price, date of sale, interest 
rate, or terms of payment”). My research methodology and broader findings 
are discussed infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text, but again I caution 
the reader against overgeneralizing from these cases. See supra note 12. 
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2. Rely on Self-Enforcement 
A second explanation for vague contracts in the face of the 
indefiniteness doctrine is that the parties do not really care 
whether courts will uphold the agreement. The contracts may 
be self-enforcing, such that the parties have extralegal incen-
tives to work out disputes among themselves.76 For example, if 
they expect to engage in many future transactions, then the 
gains from capsizing an immediate agreement may be out-
weighed by the loss from future deals.77 Or the parties may do 
business in a tightly knit community where harm to one’s repu-
tation would be more painful than breach would be pleasant.78 
For these reasons, among others, parties may write indefinite 
contracts with impunity and rely on norms or other character-
istics of their commercial relationship—instead of the legal sys-
tem—for enforcement. 
The literature on self-enforcing contracts and relational 
contracting is extensive, and I will not try to review it here.79 
But one point is worth raising: self-enforcing contracts are gen-
erally thought to represent just a small share of all agreements 
that are formed.80 Most of the available evidence suggests that 
self-enforcing contracts spring up through homogeneity—
occurring either in markets for homogeneous goods or in mar-
kets with homogeneous ethnic participants.81 In these situa-
tions, the damage to a breaching party from foregone future 
deals or bruised reputation is likely to be particularly acute, 
raising the incentives to work it out privately. 
 
 76. See Scott, supra note 18, at 2039–42; Williamson, supra note 18, at 
183. 
 77. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 159–87 
(1994); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 225–35; Douglas G. Baird, Self-
Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 583, 
583–96 (1990); Goetz & Scott, supra note 18; L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-
Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27, 27–44 (1980). 
 78. See sources cited supra note 19. 
 79. For an excellent review of the literature, including a comprehensive 
bibliography, see Morten Hviid, Long-Term Contracts and Relational Con-
tracts, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 46, 46–
72. A 1999 symposium in honor of Ian R. Macneil at the Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law also celebrated relational contracting scholarship. Sympo-
sium, Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
735 (2000). 
 80. See Scott, supra note 8, at 1644, 1646 (“[I]t is generally assumed that 
many (if not most) contracts fall outside the self-enforcing range.”). 
 81. See Landa, supra note 19; Richman, supra note 19; Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 17, at 557; Scott, supra note 8, at 1646 & n.18. 
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It is likely, therefore, that self-enforcement will explain 
just a subset of deliberately indefinite contracts.82 Is there an-
other plausible explanation? 83 
3. Avoid Deal Disruption Through Strategic Ambiguity 
When parties sit down to negotiate a particularly conten-
tious or complicated deal, one well-known strategy is to agree 
on the easy issues early and put off the difficult ones for later.84 
For example, merger negotiations between two large firms may 
reserve tough decisions—such as who will take over as CEO or 
who will control more board seats—for the very last. Or legisla-
tors may draft a bill in broad strokes and then resort to vague 
statutory language to bridge a final political chasm.85 Why re-
 
 82. It is worth asking, of course, whether the domain of self-enforcing con-
tracts might be larger than previously thought. Robert Scott, for example, has 
argued that many contracts are self-enforcing because parties are motivated 
by a sense of reciprocal fairness. Scott, supra note 8, at 1661–72. Drawing 
upon experimental economics, he hints that nearly half of the total contracting 
population could be included in this group. Id. at 1662–63. Even if the scope of 
self-enforcing contracts is truly this large, however, there are reasons to focus 
on the proper role of the state in enforcing contracts. See, e.g., Schwartz & 
Scott, supra note 17, at 557–59. 
 83. Three additional possibilities, which I will not explore in detail in this 
Article, involve agency costs, bounded rationality, and signaling effects. See 
Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 73, at 902; Triantis, supra note 13, at 1067. 
Agency costs could theoretically lead to vague contracts if agents shirk their 
duties and fail to invest appropriately in specific terms for their principals. 
Triantis, supra note 13, at 1067. Bounded rationality might lead to vague con-
tracts if the parties fail to distinguish certain contingencies, underestimate 
the likelihood of a particular contingency, or do not see a need to specify de-
tailed performance metrics. See HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE 
ARTIFICIAL 31–61 (1981); Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 73, at 902. These 
considerations are closely related to the ones I raise infra Part II.B.4. Robert 
Scott and George Triantis have recently offered a third explanation: that par-
ties might intentionally introduce unverifiable, vague terms into a contract as 
a signaling mechanism. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 13, at 849–50; Trian-
tis, supra note 13, at 1073–76. According to Triantis, “[P]arties might contract 
on factors that are not verifiable if there is a sufficiently significant difference 
in the cost of proving or rebutting a truthful versus a false representation of 
the state of the world.” Triantis, supra note 13, at 1076. 
 84. See, e.g., DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NE-
GOTIATOR 88–116 (1986); Ben-Shahar, supra note 22, at 402–05. 
 85. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have argued, for example, that the 
drafters of recent revisions to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code were 
inclined to use vague language in order to increase the likelihood that their 
amendments would be adopted. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Politi-
cal Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 607–10 (1995); 
Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1009–11 
(2002). 
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tain this ambiguity? Wouldn’t it be better to confront the hard 
issues first to figure out whether there is even a zone of agree-
ment? 
Maybe not. There can be strategic reasons to defer conten-
tious matters.86 Perhaps the parties want to gather momentum 
for the deal and cultivate a cordial working relationship. They 
may believe that the hard terms will be easier to work through 
once the easy terms are settled and the contract starts to take 
shape.87 Or it may be that deferring a divisive issue may allow 
the parties to avoid dealing with it altogether. After all, some 
issues become less important or less contentious as time passes 
and events change.88 By delaying confrontation, the parties can 
wait out some contingencies in the hope that they will sort 
themselves out.89 In either case, the parties may fear that forc-
ing resolution of a contentious term will shipwreck the deal, 
while skirting the issue—by employing strategic ambiguity— 
 
 
 
 86. See, e.g., ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, CO-
OPETITION 222–28 (1996) (discussing strategies to “stir up the fog” in business 
transactions); Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 73, at 902–04 (describing 
how purposefully indefinite contracts, even for verifiable terms, might in-
crease joint surplus when other parts of the agreement are unverifiable); 
Birger Wernerfelt, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (MIT Sloan Sch. of 
Mgmt., MIT Sloan Working Paper 4506–04, 2004), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=583742 (combining the transaction 
costs and strategic-ambiguity rationales to show how vague contracts, com-
bined with a threat of renegotiation, can increase joint surplus). 
 87. Ben-Shahar, supra note 22, at 403 (“The parties may believe that the 
obstacles to agreement for some issues may subside after most of the transac-
tion is determined, or that future negotiations may succeed where present ne-
gotiations failed.”). 
 88. To continue with the merger example, maybe one of the two possible 
CEOs will decide to retire, mooting the debate over who should lead the com-
panies following the merger. For a high-profile example of this, see Tracie 
Rozhon & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Federated Shows Renewed Interest in a Deal 
for May, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at C1 (describing renewed merger talks 
and the subsequent agreement following the resignation of one firm’s CEO). 
 89. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 22, at 403 (“Parties may also set aside 
sticky issues in the hope that they might be able to sidestep them, as when the 
likelihood of a relevant contingency declines.”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing 
the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 
CAL. L. REV. 541, 547 (1994) (“[U]ncertainty about the future makes it advis-
able for contracting parties to defer negotiation on some aspects of their rela-
tionship until more is known about the shape of future events.”); William C. 
Whitford, Relational Contracts and the New Formalism, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
631, 636 (“If the parties can delay a decision, then it may be clear that a con-
tingency will not happen, or a key individual may retire or be reassigned.”). 
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can preserve the contract, or possibly even increase joint sur-
plus.90 
To use Baer v. Chase as an illustration,91 Robert Baer 
might have easily stated his price to guide David Chase 
through the back alleys of Newark and edit his Sopranos 
manuscripts—along with the conditions under which Baer 
would receive payment. For example, he could have offered his 
services for perhaps five percent of the show’s profits, payable 
only if earnings exceeded $10 million. 
So why didn’t he? Baer might have left the arrangement 
vague because it was costly to hash through an agreement or 
because he thought that the contract would be self-enforcing. 
But these explanations are not very satisfying. It would not 
take long to negotiate a few important, specific, and presuma-
bly verifiable, terms. And Baer and Chase were relative strang-
ers living on opposite coasts, not colleagues with a long working 
relationship.92 
Instead, I think strategic ambiguity is a much more likely 
explanation for the vagueness of their agreement. Baer was 
probably afraid that if he pushed the issue of price—demanding 
the large share of profits that he truly hoped to get—then 
Chase would balk at paying this much for his services and fig-
ure out another way to navigate New Jersey’s mafia dens. And 
similarly, Chase may have feared that if he insisted on nailing 
down the terms of the deal, this would reveal his unwillingness 
to pay Baer very much, causing Chase to lose a convenient 
guide. Both parties found it better to make a vague agreement, 
expecting that either a key contingency would never arrive (for 
example, this project would never go anywhere) or that they 
would work out the right price—“right” meaning different 
things to each of them—later. 
As we shall see, this strategic ambiguity is partially re-
sponsible for creating an embedded option latent in some vague 
contracts. But it is only half of the story. The parties must also 
believe that the contract might be legally enforced notwith-
standing the indefiniteness doctrine. To see why they may hold 
this belief, it is important to briefly consider how the law’s ap-
proach to indefinite contracts has changed over time. 
 
 90. See Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 73, at 903–04; Wernerfelt, su-
pra note 86, at 3. 
 91. See supra notes 32–47 and accompanying text. 
 92. Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 612–13 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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B. HISTORICAL SOLUTIONS TO INDEFINITE CONTRACTS 
1. Quash the Contract 
The traditional common law held that sufficiently indefi-
nite contracts were void.93 If an agreement failed to include a 
critical term, then courts were obligated to strike down the 
agreement under the premise that the parties had not really 
sought to be bound. And the indefiniteness doctrine was often 
far-reaching, extending to situations where parties kept silent 
on key terms, where they adopted vague language, or where 
they just formed an agreement to agree.94 
Even at common law, however, there were some exceptions 
to this formal use of the indefiniteness doctrine, especially if 
the contract involved goods. In certain, limited circumstances, a 
court might be willing to fill a gap—even an important gap like 
price—if there was an objective way to do so and if it seemed 
that the parties really intended to form a binding agreement.95 
But apart from these limited exceptions, indefinite agreements 
were quashed under common law. 
2. Fill the Gap 
The middle decades of the twentieth century, however, 
brought a sense that a strict definiteness requirement—along 
with other formalities in contract law—should be eased.96 The 
Uniform Commercial Code codified this sentiment with section 
2-204, which states, “Even if one or more terms are left open, a 
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties 
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably cer-
tain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”97 In other words, 
courts should be willing to fill gaps by looking directly to the  
question of contractual intent and avoid using the degree of 
 
 93. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.27; MURRAY, supra note 2, § 38; 
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9; Scott, supra note 8, at 1647–49; Nellie Eunsoo 
Choi, Note, Contracts with Open or Missing Terms Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Common Law: A Proposal for Unification, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 50, 53–54, 56–58 (2003). 
 94. PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9; Scott, supra note 8, at 1648. 
 95. Scott, supra note 8, at 1648–49; Choi, supra note 93, at 54. In one 
case, for example, a court was willing to insert a missing price term in an 
automobile sales contract because the dealer sold cars for a fixed price and 
there was sufficient evidence of contractual intent. McIllmoil v. Frawley Motor 
Co., 213 P. 971, 974 (Cal. 1923). 
 96. Scott, supra note 8, at 1649–52; Choi, supra note 93, at 54–55. 
 97. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2004). 
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completeness as a proxy for intent to be bound.98 
While it may seem that the U.C.C. broke little new 
ground—since exceptions for indefinite contracts had been 
made in the past—the approach was, in fact, different. There 
was now a much stronger sense that gaps should be filled 
whenever possible.99 Courts began to claim that the indefinite-
ness doctrine was “against the policy of the law,” or that “strik-
ing down a contract for uncertainty [was] disfavored.”100 Arthur 
Corbin summed up the philosophy succinctly: “the court should 
not frustrate [the parties’] intention if it is possible to reach a 
fair and just result, even though this requires a choice among 
conflicting meanings and the filling of some gaps that the par-
ties have left.”101 A presumption towards gap filling emerged, 
one that has been echoed favorably by the Restatement102 and 
scholarly commentary.103 
3. Take an Intermediate Solution 
Yet for all this eagerness to throw out the indefiniteness 
doctrine, courts have not obliged.104 In fact, if anything, judicial 
 
 98. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 22, at 394; Scott, supra note 8, at 1649–
52. 
 99. Scott, supra note 8, at 1650–51. This sentiment can be found through-
out the Uniform Commercial Code E.g., U.C.C. § 2-311(1) (2004) (“An agree-
ment for sale which is otherwise sufficiently definite . . . to be a contract is not 
made invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of performance to be speci-
fied by one of the parties.”). 
 100. E.g., N. Crossarm Co. v. Chem. Specialties, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 752, 
760 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (“Striking down a contract for uncertainty is disfavored. 
Courts are empowered to supply a deficient term when the parties’ intent can 
be determined from the surrounding circumstances.”); Jones v. Hill, 539 
S.E.2d 893, 895 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he policy of the law is against the de-
struction of contracts on the ground of uncertainty if it is possible in light of 
the circumstances under which the contract was made to determine the rea-
sonable intention of the parties.”). 
 101. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 4.1, at 533. Corbin went on to argue that this 
is true because the law “must take language as it is and people as they are.” 
Id. at 530. 
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981). 
 103. See Gergen, supra note 6, at 1062 (supporting “the now (happily) dis-
credited doctrine that courts ought not enforce indefinite contracts”); Scott, 
supra note 8, at 1651 (“The contemporary presumption toward filling gaps in 
incomplete contracts has led commentators to assume that the common law 
indefiniteness doctrine is no longer a serious impediment to legal enforce-
ment.”); Choi, supra note 93, at 50 (“[C]ourts should apply the U.C.C. analysis 
to both sale-of-goods and service contracts.”). On the more general point that 
contractual gap filling is desirable, see sources cited supra note 6. 
 104. Scott, supra note 8, at 1652–53. 
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encounters with the indefiniteness doctrine may be increas-
ing.105 In 2003 and 2004 alone, parties litigated 118 new cases 
involving indefiniteness.106 Courts also appear to be annulling 
contracts under the doctrine with roughly the same fre-
quency.107 So why do courts refuse to plug the gaps? And what 
theory are they using when deciding whether to annul for in-
definiteness? 
It is hard to say. Courts have apparently decided to imple-
ment an intermediate solution, striking down some ambiguous 
agreements and upholding others according to individual cir-
cumstances of the case. And unfortunately, it is difficult to for-
mulate a hypothesis that explains why courts are coming out 
the way they do.108 The results do not appear to depend on 
whether a contract is for goods or services, whether the litiga-
tion takes place in a state that continues to prefer the common 
 
 105. The annual number of reported cases involving the indefiniteness doc-
trine since 2000 are as follows: 
Year Cases 
2005 76 
2004 53 
2003 65 
2002 63 
2001 53 
2000 48 
To determine these figures, I searched Westlaw’s 95k9(1) database “Con-
tracts: Requisites and Validity: Nature and Essentials in General: Certainty 
as to Subject Matter: In General.” I included all state and federal courts in the 
search. Of course these statistics do not indicate the total number of litigated 
cases, so it is impossible to tell if any increase is merely driven by an expand-
ing caseload. Search of WESTLAW (Apr. 21, 2006). 
 106. See supra note 105. 
 107. A research assistant and I analyzed all 53 cases involving indefinite-
ness during the year 2004. We found that 11 of the cases only touched on the 
doctrine peripherally. Cf. Scott, supra note 8, at 1652–53 (discussing a similar 
study of cases between 1998 and 2002). Courts invalidated the agreements for 
indefiniteness in 19 of the remaining cases, or at a rate of roughly 45 percent. 
While this analysis suggests that Professor Scott’s findings extend past the 
five-year period of his study, it is difficult to draw further conclusions due to 
selection biases. 
 108. See Scott, supra note 8, at 1653–55. To take one of many pairs of cases 
with similar facts but different results, compare Imi Norgren, Inc. v. D & D 
Tooling Manufacturing, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (annul-
ling a settlement agreement for indefiniteness where the parties agreed that 
payment would be secured but did not specify the precise security measures), 
with Elite Show Services, Inc. v. Staffpro, Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184, 188–89 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding a settlement agreement notwithstanding an 
indefinite term that provided payment of “reasonable attorney fees”). 
GEIS_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:31:43 AM 
1686 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1664 
 
law approach to indefiniteness, or any other obvious factor.109 
We have arrived, then, at an intermediate solution where 
some indefinite contracts are enforced while others are an-
nulled. And it can be difficult to predict in advance which way a 
court will rule. It is just this legal uncertainty—combined with 
the strategic ambiguity rationale for forming vague contracts 
described earlier110—that can give rise to an embedded option. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING INDEFINITE CONTRACTS  
AS EMBEDDED OPTIONS 
Option theory has played a major role in economic, finance, 
and management research for the past several decades.111 It is 
now used routinely in the formation of business strategy,112 and 
techniques for valuing and managing embedded options 
abound.113 But the work has only just started to generate ro-
bust insights in the legal literature. Recent analysis explores 
how option theory can help legal scholars rethink problems re-
lated to tort, property, procedure, bankruptcy, securities regu-
lation, and other areas of the law.114 And option theory is par-
 
 109. Scott, supra note 8, at 1653–55. According to Professor Scott, courts 
might be “focus[ing] on whether the parties have fully exploited verifiable in-
formation in concluding their agreements.” Id. at 1654–55. This important 
point is discussed infra Part III.C. 
 110. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 111. The modern era for options scholarship dates to the early 1970s, when 
Merton, Black, and Scholes developed path-breaking methods for measuring 
the value of options. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options 
and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973); Robert C. Merton, The-
ory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. 141 (1973). Broader discus-
sions of option applications can be found in RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. 
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 583–644 (6th ed. 2000) and JOHN 
C. HULL, FUNDAMENTALS OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS 263–85 (5th ed. 
2005). 
 112. See Tom Copeland & Peter Tufano, A Real-World Way to Manage Real 
Options, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2004, at 90, 90 (reporting that a 2001 survey 
revealed that twenty-seven percent of CFOs “always or almost always” used 
option theory to guide business decisions). 
 113. E.g., MUN, supra note 21; LENOS TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANA-
GERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION (1996); Thomas 
E. Copeland & Philip T. Keenan, How Much Is Flexibility Worth?, MCKINSEY 
Q., 1998 no. 2, at 38; Timothy A. Luehrman, Investment Opportunities as Real 
Options: Getting Started on the Numbers, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1998, at 
51. 
 114. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTI-
TLEMENTS (2005) (discussing how laws create options in a wide variety of con-
texts); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (2005) 
(using an embedded option theory to offer a middle-ground solution to the li-
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ticularly well-suited to the analysis of contract law, as both 
fields wrestle with problems related to exchange, valuation, 
and uncertainty. A number of insightful articles have made this 
connection.115 
This Part adds to the discussion by showing how contrac-
tual ambiguity can, under the right circumstances, give rise to 
an embedded interpretive option. It then goes on to argue that 
parties may not fully appreciate the creation or cost of these op-
tions. This means that embedded options may sometimes dis-
tort efficient trade and investment decisions. But first, it is 
necessary to briefly lay out what embedded options are, and 
how they arise. 
A. WHAT ARE EMBEDDED OPTIONS? 
Many people are familiar with explicit options. For exam-
ple, I might pay $5 down to secure the right to purchase a given 
share of stock during a three-month period for $100. Explicit 
options thus confer a right—but not an obligation—to buy or 
sell a good at a stated price for a given period of time.116 This 
privilege often, but not always, comes with a price tag,117 and 
its ultimate value to the buyer will vary with the value of the 
underlying good.118 An option can also be combined with an-
 
ability-entitlement problem in tort and property law); Peter H. Huang, Corpo-
rate Finance: Teaching Corporate Law From an Option Perspective, 34 GA. L. 
REV. 571 (2000) (applying option analysis to several legal contexts); Peter H. 
Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation 
Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47 (2004); Mark Klock, Financial Options, Real Op-
tions, and Legal Options: Opting to Exploit Ourselves and What We Can Do 
About It, 55 ALA. L. REV. 63 (2004) (discussing option pricing and the creation 
of options through bankruptcy, litigation, contract law, and tort law); James C. 
Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response, Univ. of Chi., John M. 
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 243 (2d Series), 2005, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=719768 (discussing how embedded put options that 
arise in the IPO context distort manager incentives). 
 115. See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 
VA. L. REV. 2187 (2004); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options 
Pricing, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1995); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, 
Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1428 (2004). Much of this work explores how options are cre-
ated by contract remedies; this Article shifts the focus to options arising from 
contract interpretation. 
 116. TRIGEORGIS, supra note 113, at 69. 
 117. Katz, supra note 115, at 2188, 2234–36. 
 118. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 111, at 596–601. Continuing the ex-
ample in the text, if the stock price rises to $200, the net profit from the call 
option will be $95 ($200 – $100 – $5). If the stock price drops to $50, then the 
option expires out of the money. 
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other derivative, or with economic positions in the underlying 
good, to craft precise risks.119 
An embedded option, by contrast, is created implicitly 
when valuable opportunities—but again, not obligations—to 
take action in the future arise from outcomes that are uncer-
tain today.120 The option might be generated by a capital-asset 
purchase or other strategic investment. A decision to locate a 
factory in China, for example, may not make financial sense in 
its own right but could open up wonderful opportunities in the 
future—doors that will never appear unless this first step is 
taken.121 Or an embedded option might be created through a 
legal entitlement, such as the right to sue and invest in discov-
ery122 or the right to breach a contract and pay damages.123 
It is important to note that while options emanate from 
uncertainty, not all uncertainty gives rise to an embedded op-
tion. The key requirement is that some of the uncertainty will 
be alleviated before the need to make a subsequent decision 
arises.124 For example, our manager may not know whether his 
Chinese factory will be profitable—and accordingly, he develops 
best case and worst case financial projections. If he must pay 
the entire purchase price up front and then just wait to see how 
the project unfolds, no option is created. The die has already 
been cast, and the manager has no way to adjust his construc-
tion decisions as the fog of uncertainty lifts. 
The ability to take action with new information, however, 
can create an embedded option. For instance, if the factory 
manager need not build the entire project according to a pre-
destined plan, there may be options to abandon or delay com-
pletion. Or there may be an expansion option if Chinese con-
nections could lead to a lucrative new market for his products—
 
 119. For example, a put option might be combined with a share of stock to 
insure against downside losses, while preserving most of the gains from upside 
price appreciation. Id. at 589–96; HULL, supra note 111, at 225–42. 
 120. See TRIGEORGIS, supra note 113, at 69. 
 121. This example is an expansion option (the flexibility to choose among 
several growth strategies). Other embedded options include compound options 
(which are nested in another embedded option), switching options (the right 
and ability to switch to a different set of operating conditions), and abandon-
ment options (the right to halt investment). MUN, supra note 21, at 13–20. 
 122. Cornell, supra note 29, at 173. 
 123. Scott & Triantis, supra note 115, at 1428; Alexander J. Triantis & 
George G. Triantis, Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions, 41 J.L. & 
ECON. 163, 163–65 (1998). 
 124. Luehrman, supra note 21, 89–90. 
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even though the expansion would require substantial costs to 
develop. Good news brings new, but worthwhile, expenditures, 
while bad news saves him from spending. So embedded options 
come when uncertainty is resolved through the passing of time 
and there are opportunities to make mid-course changes that 
incorporate this new information. 
As a final illustration, consider the game of blackjack. A 
player places a bet, is dealt two cards, and observes one of the 
dealer’s two cards. The player then draws additional cards to 
beat the dealer—by coming as close as possible to the sum of 21 
without going over. Normally, players are not allowed to in-
crease their bet after the cards are dealt; it would be advanta-
geous, for example, to get more money on the table if the dealer 
turns up a bad card for his hand. But players can often “double 
down,” or double their bets in exchange for just one more card. 
This right—but not obligation—to double down might be con-
sidered an embedded option. A player can make the investment 
in a greater wager after receiving information about the 
dealer’s hand.125 And he need not increase his bet if, for exam-
ple, the dealer shows an ace.126 
But embedded options are not just relegated to business 
investments and gambling. The structuring of a legal entitle-
ment might also create an option.127 As the next section begins 
to argue, embedded interpretive options can sometimes arise 
with indefinite contracts. 
B. CREATING EMBEDDED OPTIONS WITH INDEFINITE 
CONTRACTS 
The creation of embedded options with indefinite contracts 
is best illustrated through a series of examples. So, consider the 
plight of a soybean farmer in early April who faces an arduous 
six-month growing season. He needs to plant the fields in May 
and June, monitor weather and pest information through the 
summer months, and harvest and sell the crops from Septem-
ber through October. 
By forming a contract with a buyer on April 1 for a specific 
price six months later, say $10 per bushel, it is common sense 
 
 125. The exercise price comes from the cost of the additional bet, along 
with the fact that players are limited to drawing one additional card. 
 126. There are other embedded options in the game as well, such as the 
right to split hands when the player is dealt a matching pair. 
 127. See AYRES, supra note 114, at 3–6; Fennell supra note 114, at 1413–
14. 
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that the farmer can shift the risk of price fluctuations during 
this time period to the buyer.128 If the market price drops below 
$10, the farmer can rest easy—even though he must also forego 
price gains above that mark. He might also rely on the contract 
to make relation-specific investments in the crops that increase 
the overall benefits of trade.129 
A complete contract between the farmer and buyer would 
specify every possible contingency—drought, fuel-price spikes, 
soybean rust, new seed varieties, and so on—and the resulting 
impact on the agreement if each event should occur. But we 
know that complete contracts are fiction; there will always be 
some ambiguity, or indefiniteness, left in the agreement.130 
Consider how these contractual ambiguities can sometimes 
lead to embedded options. 
1. Output and Requirements Contracts 
Start with a familiar ambiguity. Suppose the parties de-
cline to specify the quantity of soybean bushels governed by the 
contract, but decide instead to leave the term open and create 
an output contract.131 The farmer commits to sell—and the 
buyer agrees to take—all the soybeans grown on his land dur-
ing this season for $10 per bushel. 
This output contract presents a clear example of an em-
bedded option.132 The seller has flexibility to produce and sell 
more or less goods as new information or other events impact 
his cost and profitability. This option may be limited by law, 
 
 128. See Craswell, supra note 52, at 488–89; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk 
Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 427 
(1983). For a classic case along these lines, see Bolin Farms v. American Cot-
ton Shippers Ass’n, 370 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D. La. 1974). 
 129. Craswell, supra note 52, at 489–95; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 17, 
at 559–62. For example, the farmer may be willing to build a storage facility 
that uniquely benefits the buyer. Worthwhile investments that can be rede-
ployed to other uses—for example, investments in pesticides or weather-
related information that boost the overall crop yield—will usually make sense 
even in the absence of a contract. Id. 
 130. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 131. An output contract arises when a seller agrees to sell and a buyer 
agrees to take all goods produced during a certain time period. FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 2, § 2.15. Commentators seem to agree that output and require-
ments contracts are useful ways to shift risk and should be deemed valid. See, 
e.g., John C. Weistart, Requirements and Output Contracts: Quantity Varia-
tions Under the UCC, 1973 DUKE L.J. 599, 607–22 (1973). 
 132. See Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Con-
tracts: Reigning in Good-Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319, 324 (2002); Katz, 
supra note 115, at 2230–34; Scott & Triantis, supra note 115, at 1429, 1454. 
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however, because extremely unreasonable swings in quantity 
are disallowed under the doctrine of good faith133 or the 
U.C.C.134 Nevertheless, there is still real value to this flexibil-
ity.135 In effect, the farmer is bound to sell a minimum volume 
of goods in good faith, while also enjoying a qualified put option 
conferring the right to sell more bushels for $10—which he will 
exercise if key uncertainties are resolved in a favorable man-
ner.136 
A requirements contract, where the buyer agrees to pur-
chase as much as business “requires,” raises very similar is-
sues. The buyer now enjoys a right, but not an obligation, to 
purchase more goods if she needs them. In essence, the buyer 
receives a qualified call option—qualified, again, in the sense 
that it cannot, in good faith, fall below some lower limit or 
above some upper limit137—to buy more goods at the same price 
for the duration of the contract. The seller thus bears the risk 
that buyer demand will be greater or smaller than expected.138 
And while output and requirements contracts might con-
ceivably be struck down for indefiniteness—they do not, after 
all, specify a quantity—courts have been willing to let them 
stand.139 Perhaps this is because these contracts are thought to 
 
 133. E.g., Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., 335 N.E.2d 320, 323 (N.Y. 
1975) (requiring seller to make bread crumbs under an output contract rather 
than merely sell crumbs if it did make them). Victor Goldberg offers extended 
discussion of this issue. Goldberg, supra note 132. 
 134. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code codifies the good-faith limi-
tation on extreme quantities under output and requirements contracts. U.C.C. 
§ 2-306(1) (2004). 
 135. Katz, supra note 115, at 2230–43. 
 136. Qualified, again, in the sense that extreme changes in the quantity 
delivered or demanded under these contracts may violate the duty of good 
faith in contract performance. 
 137. E.g., Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1335, 
1340–41 (7th Cir.1988) (deeming a buyer’s decision bad faith when it reduced 
purchases to zero under a contract to buy “approximately three thousand . . . 
units, more or less, depending upon requirements”); see also Goldberg, supra 
note 132 (discussing courts’ use of good faith in interpretation of open quantity 
contracts). 
 138. For an explanation of why the seller might be willing to do this see 
Katz, supra note 115, at 2217–26. 
 139. U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2 (“Under this Article, a contract for output or re-
quirements is not too indefinite since it is held to mean the actual good-faith 
output or requirements of the particular party.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, 
§ 2.15. Representative cases applying the indefiniteness doctrine to these 
types of contracts include Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equipment Corp., 815 F.2d 
806, 811 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[S]ince the evidence demonstrated that both parties 
intended a requirements contract based on the buyer’s good-faith needs, ‘the 
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represent a conscious transfer of risk between the two parties. 
Or perhaps it is because judges or juries have a principled way 
to determine, at the end of the day, whether a breach occurred. 
How many bushels did the farmer grow that season? Or how 
many soybeans did the buyer need to conduct her business? 
A court’s approach will likely be different, of course, if the 
output or requirements contract is replaced by an agreement 
that remains absolutely silent in terms of quantity. For exam-
ple, a deal where the farmer agrees to “sell soybeans for $10 per 
bushel,” without stating anything further, raises a more trou-
bling ambiguity. Without anything else—such as a clear pat-
tern of industry custom or historical dealing between the par-
ties—courts will not plug the gap.140 This means that no option 
is formed because neither the buyer nor the seller enjoys the 
flexibility to alter the quantity of goods upon request.141 The 
contract is void. 
So, importantly, the creation of an embedded option in this 
context depends on the willingness of courts to resolve ambigui-
ties and uphold contracts—at least some of the time. And while 
courts may be unwilling to enforce contracts with unstated 
quantity terms, they will often plug gaps for many other terms 
related to price, delivery, unexpected contingencies, and so 
on.142 This willingness to award a legal entitlement from con-
tractual ambiguity can give rise to another type of embedded 
option. 
2. Vagueness + Information + Judicial Gap Filling = 
Embedded Option 
Suppose there is a different ambiguity in the soybean sales 
 
indefiniteness of the written quantity term does not invalidate the agree-
ment.’” O.N. Jonas Co., Inc. v. Badische Corp., 706 F.2d 1161, 1165 (11th Cir. 
1983)) and G.B. “Boots” Smith Corp. v. Cobb, 860 So. 2d 774, 777 (Miss. 2003) 
(“Requirements contracts are recognized in Mississippi and are not void for 
indefiniteness.”). 
 140. See PERILLO, supra note 2, §2.9, at 56 (“[W]here the parties have omit-
ted from their agreement the . . . quantity of goods . . . the courts have refused 
to fill the gap because no objective standard can ordinarily be found in such 
cases.”). 
 141. However, economic distortions may still occur if either side continues 
to perceive a chance of enforcing the contract at law. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 142. See supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text. The U.C.C. provides, 
of course, a wide range of contractual gap fillers. E.g., U.C.C § 2-305 (2004) 
(price); U.C.C § 2-307 (2004) (apportioned delivery); U.C.C § 2-308 (2004) 
(place of delivery); U.C.C § 2-309 (2004) (time of delivery); U.C.C § 2-310 
(2004) (time of payment). 
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contract. The parties have now set a quantity of bushels, but 
the agreement does not describe the exact type of crops to be 
delivered. More specifically, imagine there are two different 
strains of soybeans—say strain 1 and strain 2.143 Both strains 
are grown by the farmer, used by the buyer, and commonly sold 
in the marketplace, so it will be difficult to determine exactly 
which type the parties meant. Under this contract, then, the 
term “soybean” might be considered indefinite. The failure to 
use a precise description, combined with a belief that the gap 
might be filled under law, can produce another, more subtle, 
embedded option for each party. 
a. Buyer Options 
Let’s model the situation from the buyer’s point of view. 
Suppose she plans to process and resell the soybeans in six 
months’ time.144 Her profits from either strain of soybeans will 
depend, in large part, on how other farms fare across the 
United States. Strain 1 soybeans are grown mostly in the 
Heartland—a fertile farm region in the Midwest—and if the 
crops flourish there this season, the buyer’s strain 1 resale 
price will suffer.145 Strain 2 soybeans come primarily from the 
Mississippi Portal region (mostly Arkansas, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana), and prices will, again, depend on the success of 
farms there. Both regions face independent weather conditions, 
and the seller is assumed to be in a different part of the coun-
try, and thus unaffected by the news. 
At the time of contracting, the buyer has only estimates for 
the probability of good news or bad news for each market and 
the resulting impact on profitability. Three months into the 
contract, however, new information on weather and likely yield 
for these two farm regions will emerge, giving the buyer a 
clearer understanding of her profits for both strains of soy-
beans. And shortly after the state of nature is revealed, the 
seller will announce his delivery intentions—whether he plans 
to deliver strain 1 or strain 2 crops. At this point, the buyer can 
 
 143. While different types of soybean strains are grown across the United 
States, the example here is merely hypothetical. 
 144. Processing and marketing costs are assumed to be the same for both 
strains of soybeans and are excluded to simplify the discussion. 
 145. The example is adapted from actual market conditions. See Linda 
Foreman & Janet Livezey, Characteristics and Production Costs of U.S. Soy-
bean Farms, USDA STATISTICAL BULLETIN NO. 974-4 (2002), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/sb974-4/sb974-4.pdf. 
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decide whether to accept or contest the seller’s decision (Figure 
1 illustrates the contracting timeline). 
Figure 1.  Contracting Timeline 
 
First, let’s ask whether the buyer will contract with defi-
niteness for either strain of soybeans. Figure 2 puts some sim-
ple numbers to this example: suppose at the time of contract-
ing, the buyer believes that strain 1 crops will face bad news 90 
percent of the time and good news just 10 percent of the 
time.146 She can resell her processed soybeans for only $10 per 
bushel with bad news, thus making no profit after the $10 con-
tract price is deducted. But her payoff jumps to $8 per bushel if 
good news occurs. Contracting costs in all cases are assumed to 
be $1 per bushel, and this works out to an expected loss for 
strain 1 crops of $0.20 per bushel.147 Under these conditions, 
then, the buyer will not contract with specificity for strain 1 
soybeans. 
Figure 2.  Payoff to Buyer from Definite Contract—Strain 1 
 
 
 146. Again, bad news in this context means that the Heartland farms do 
well and strain 1 soybeans are in great supply—pushing down the resale 
prices and profitability for the buyer (demand effects during this time period 
are ignored). Good news means that Heartland farms face poor growing condi-
tions, decreasing supply and increasing the price of strain 1. 
 147. The expected value is calculated as follows: [(probability of bad news) 
* (profits with bad news)] + [(probability of good news) * (profits with good 
news)] – transaction costs to contract = [(0.9) * ($0)] + [(0.1) * ($8)] – $1 = 
– $0.20. The time value of money is excluded from all calculations in this sec-
tion to simplify the analysis. 
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As Figure 3 illustrates, the analysis is similar for strain 2 
soybeans. The chance of good news is assumed to be a little 
higher, at 30 percent, but the upside profit from good news is 
now only $3. As before, bad news leads to zero profits, and 
when the $1 cost of contracting is subtracted, the buyer expects 
to lose $0.10 per bushel. She will again refuse to contract with 
specificity for strain 2 crops.148 
Figure 3.  Payoff to Buyer from Definite Contract—Strain 2 
 
The buyer’s contracting preferences may change, however, 
if she can write an indefinite contract and wait to see how soy-
bean crops in the Heartland and Mississippi Portal will fare. 
New information, combined with the subsequent ability to in-
vest in litigation or persuasion for her preferred term, creates 
an embedded option. 
Figure 4 fleshes out the example. Starting with T1, the 
probabilities of good news and bad news in both growing re-
gions are now combined to give four possible states of nature.149 
To determine the resulting buyer payoffs in each state, it is 
necessary to work through different outcomes related to the de-
livery intentions of the seller, the persuasion/litigation deci-
sions of the buyer, and the ultimate outcome of the dispute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 148. The expected value is calculated as in supra note 147: [(0.7) * ($0)] + 
[(0.3) * ($3)] – $1 = –$0.10. 
 149. Bad news strain 1—bad news strain 2 occurs 63 percent of the time 
(0.9 * 0.7). Bad news strain 1—good news strain 2 occurs 27 percent of the 
time (0.9 * 0.3). Good news strain 1—bad news strain 2 occurs 7 percent of the 
time (0.1 * 0.7). And good news in both markets occurs just 3 percent of the 
time (0.1 * 0.3). 
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Figure 4.  Payoff to Buyer from Indefinite 
Contract with Litigation Option 
 
For instance, start with the bottom branch—the rare case 
where the buyer receives good news in both markets. This ex-
ample assumes that the seller will announce intentions to de-
liver strain 1 soybeans 50 percent of the time,150 and if this oc-
curs, the buyer will happily accept delivery. Each bushel brings 
the greatest possible profit of $8. But the other half of the time, 
when the seller announces intentions to deliver strain 2 soy-
beans, the buyer may decide to press the case that “soybeans” 
means “strain 1 soybeans” even though there are new costs to 
taking this action. In Figure 4, the buyer expects to win 75 per-
cent of the time, thereby receiving a legal entitlement to strain 
1 soybeans and $8 profit.151 She loses her case 25 percent of the 
 
 150. Changes to this assumption do not significantly affect the outcome. 
The buyer will still derive option value and seek to contract when the seller’s 
probability of delivering strain 1 is increased to 100 percent (the total expected 
value of the contract is $0.14) or decreased to 0 percent (the total expected 
value of the contract is $0.33). 
 151. This example assumes that a plaintiff ’s expected chance of victory is 
an exogenous variable. Admittedly, the analysis here is much more compli-
cated. A more accurate model might recognize that a party’s probability of suc-
cessful litigation can depend on the level of evidentiary expenditures that he is 
willing to make, which in turn will depend on the amount at stake and the ac-
tions of the other litigant. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 13, at 825–31. 
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time, receiving a $3 payoff from strain 2 soybeans. The cost of 
taking action is $1 and must be incurred win or lose. Faced 
with these numbers, the buyer will clearly decide to invest in 
persuasion/litigation, because the expected value of taking ac-
tion ($5.75) outweighs the expected value of “lumping it” and 
accepting strain 2 ($3).152 The total expected payoff to the 
buyer, therefore, is $6.875 in this state of nature.153 
Working our way up from the bottom, the analysis is simi-
lar for the next two branches. If the buyer receives good news 
for strain 1 and bad news for strain 2 (the 7 percent branch), 
then she will again pursue the litigation option if the seller 
seeks to deliver strain 2 crops.154 The total expected value in 
this case is $6.50. The buyer will also take action when the 
news is reversed (the 27 percent branch)—bad news for strain 1 
and good news for strain 2—although, importantly, she will 
now object only when the seller tries to deliver strain 1 soy-
beans (arguing that “soybeans” means “strain 2 soybeans”). The 
indefiniteness of the contract, therefore, gives the buyer addi-
tional flexibility to push for different interpretations to maxi-
mize payouts in different states of the world. She does not 
know when the contract is signed which strain of soybeans will 
emerge as the more profitable crop, and ambiguity preserves 
the freedom to ask for either strain after the truth comes out—
increasing her expected chances of getting something greater 
than zero. The total expected payout in this state of nature is 
$2.125. 
Finally, consider the most common scenario: bad news for 
both markets (the 63 percent branch). As Figure 4 illustrates, 
the cost of litigation in this state is not worth it. The buyer will 
receive zero profits no matter how the case comes out and is 
better off avoiding the $1 fee. In other words, the embedded op-
tion expires out of the money, and she accepts whatever strain 
of crops that the seller plans to deliver, earning zero profits.155 
 
 152. The expected value of persuasion/litigation is calculated as follows: 
[(probability of winning) * (profits from winning)] + [(probability of losing) * 
(profits from losing)] – costs to exercise option = [(0.75) * ($8)] + [(0.25) * ($3)] 
– $1 = $5.75. This exceeds the payoff from accepting strain 2 soybeans ($3), so 
the buyer will pursue this option. 
 153. Calculated as follows: [(0.5) * ($8)] + [(0.5) * ($5.75)] = $6.875. 
 154. In fact, the benefit from exercising the persuasion/litigation option is 
even greater in this branch of the decision tree: the $5 expected payoff must be 
compared to a $0 payoff from accepting strain 2 soybeans. 
 155. The negative value of the option is shown in the figure for discussion 
purposes only, and the expected value for that branch of the decision tree is 
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When the resulting calculations are completed for all pos-
sible states of the world, it turns out that this indefinite con-
tract nets the buyer an expected value of $0.24 per bushel. Un-
der these assumptions, then, she will choose to contract with 
the seller using an indefinite contract when she would never 
sign a contract with specificity for either strain of crops.156 The 
embedded option adds new value, allowing her to invest in liti-
gation or persuasion in some states of the world, while avoiding 
this expense when the strain of crops does not matter. And cru-
cially, these persuasion costs need only be incurred after the in-
formation on market conditions comes to light. 
Of course, this option is different from a conventional call 
option because the buyer is not assured of receiving her pre-
ferred strain of soybeans. Even if she invests in litigation, she 
may lose the case. Instead of an unqualified call option on 
strain 1 soybeans at $10, she only has the right to buy a chance 
at getting strain 1 soybeans at $10.157 But as long as her per-
ceived chances of victory are high enough—because the con-
tract is truly vague, because she can build a reasonable argu-
ment for her interpretation of the disputed term, and because 
courts are willing to plug gaps158—then there will be some op-
tion value to the indefiniteness on the day that the contract is 
signed. 
b. Seller Options 
The focus has remained on the buyer thus far, but the 
seller could just as easily enjoy an embedded option from con-
tractual ambiguity. Just as the buyer benefits from an embed-
 
$0, not –$0.50. This is true because the buyer will not litigate when the seller 
announces intentions to deliver strain 2 crops, but will simply accept them for 
zero profits. 
 156. Cf. Luehrman, supra note 113, at 89–99 (showing how option theory 
can turn a losing project into one with positive net present value). Of course, 
the buyer’s decision to only contract with ambiguity is driven by the numerical 
assumptions in this example. But even if a buyer derives positive value under 
both specific and ambiguous contracts—thus always electing to contract—she 
may still wish to contract with ambiguity to secure an interpretive option and 
enjoy a greater expected payoff. 
 157. Value might also arise in a more complex model with compound op-
tions from the right to abandon claims without incurring the full costs of in-
vestment. See Cornell, supra note 29, at 187. 
 158. And perhaps because of cognitive biases that cause litigants to overes-
timate their chances of successful persuasion. See Oren Bar-Gill, Pricing Legal 
Options: A Behavioral Perspective, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 203, 215–16 (2005) (de-
scribing the role of overconfidence biases in option pricing). 
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ded call option in this example, the seller may derive value 
from an embedded put—the right to sell different strains of 
soybeans as uncertainties lift. If conditions are right, he may 
also seek to contract with ambiguity for this reason. 
Consider, briefly, one set of circumstances that might lead 
to an embedded option for the seller.159 Suppose the soybean 
farmer does not know how each strain will fare in his fields 
when the contract is signed. Depending on weather, pests, and 
other growing conditions, either strain 1 or strain 2 may prove 
more bountiful, and thus cheaper to supply. Given this uncer-
tainty, the farmer may benefit from retaining flexibility to de-
liver either strain of crops, after cost information emerges, and 
investing in an argument that the contract has been satisfied if 
the buyer objects. 
It is possible, then, that both parties to a contract will re-
ceive an embedded option from uncertainty. If so, neither may 
push to resolve ambiguous terms.160 And even if just one party 
meets the conditions necessary to create the option, he may 
seek to preserve the haze unilaterally. One side to a negotiation 
can often hem or haw to postpone pinning down a specific 
term—even when the other side is anxious to do so.161 This 
leads to the next logical question: what exactly are the condi-
tions that determine whether a meaningful embedded option 
arises from an indefinite contract? 
3. Determining Whether the Option Is Meaningful 
Option valuation is a tricky task, and it is difficult to pro-
vide a comprehensive theory for when a meaningful option of 
this type will arise. However, some useful, though rough, gen-
eralizations can certainly be made. 
First, and most obviously, the contract must have a miss-
ing or vague term that is subject to multiple meanings. This 
 
 159. For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen not to work through another 
numerical example. 
 160. The parties, of course, may not be explicitly introducing ambiguity 
into a contract to garner this option. They may instinctively sense that some 
indefinite terms are needed to close the deal or that there may be strategic 
value in preserving this ambiguity. See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 13, 
at 835 (“[C]ontracts regularly contain vague terms such as ‘best efforts,’ ‘rea-
sonable expenses,’ and ‘reasonable withholding of consent.’”); Triantis, supra 
note 13, at 1067 (“[V]ague expressions such as ‘reasonableness,’ ‘good faith’ 
and ‘best efforts’ are very common in commercial agreements.”). 
 161. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 84, at 33–34. 
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might be an open term related to delivery,162 price,163 condi-
tions of performance,164 or something else. This ambiguity is 
what allows the option holder to argue for legal entitlement to 
her preferred term down the road. Because all contracts are in-
definite to some degree, this requirement is consistently met by 
logical necessity. 
But not all ambiguities will matter. The second require-
ment for a meaningful option is that there is real impact to the 
option holder from different interpretations of the term. This is 
true because the value of an option grows as the variance of the 
underlying random variable increases165—in this case the 
spread in value to the option holder of different interpretations 
of the ambiguity. Stated more simply, an ambiguity that has 
little effect on the option holder’s ultimate valuation of the con-
tract—no matter what the circumstances—will not give rise to 
a meaningful option. A vague contract for delivery to “our 
warehouse” will not create much of an option when the buyer’s 
two warehouses are sitting side-by-side and she will not care 
where the goods end up. 
Or, to take a numerical example, return to the contract il-
lustrated in Figure 4 and reduce the good-news payoff for 
strain 1 soybeans to $4. This destroys the option value in the 
bottom branch—where both markets receive good news—
because the expected $0.75 gain from litigation is outweighed 
by the $1 litigation cost.166 Many indefinite terms, therefore, 
 
 162. See, e.g., Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 512 F.2d 365, 
366 (2d Cir. 1975) (considering a contract to sell steel where the parties agreed 
on the quantity and price but did not specify the timing of performance, 
stating only that delivery was “to be mutually agreed upon”). 
 163. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 56 (8th Cir. 
1975) (involving a contract to sell propane gas for a cryptic “Wood River Area 
Posted Price for propane plus four cents per gallon”). Arguably, ambiguous 
price terms may be less likely to create embedded options than other vague 
terms. Because the impact of different price interpretations can be observed at 
the outset of the contract, new information is unlikely to surface that will 
change the parties’ valuation of performance under different interpretations of 
the contract. In other words, the relative difference in valuation under differ-
ent interpretations of the ambiguity may be unlikely to differ over time. 
 164. The case of Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 2004), discussed su-
pra notes 32–47 and accompanying text, provides a good example. Recall that 
Chase, creator of The Sopranos, agreed to pay Baer for his services conditional 
upon the show becoming “a success.” Baer, 392 F.3d at 614. 
 165. See HULL, supra note 111, at 206–07, 267–71; MUN, supra note 21, at 
149–50. Ayres explores this point in a legal context. AYRES, supra note 114, at 
7, 44–46. 
 166. Cf. Cornell, supra note 29, at 180. Holding the other assumptions 
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may not matter much because, at the outset, they involve re-
mote contingencies or unimportant events that are unlikely to 
make a difference to the option holder. But as the underlying 
variability in valuation from different interpretations rises, so 
too will the option value. 
This does not mean, however, that the option holder must 
be free to argue both sides of the ambiguity. While the illustra-
tion in Figure 4 is constructed to give the buyer value from ar-
guing that the contract can mean strain 1 or strain 2 soybeans, 
it is important to recognize that a meaningful option can still 
arise when the option holder only seeks one possible interpreta-
tion. For example, if the costs of persuading the buyer that 
“soybeans” means strain 2 soybeans rise to $3 (perhaps because 
it is more difficult to make the argument this way), then the 
option value goes away in the second branch of the decision 
tree.167 Nevertheless, the total value of the contract to the 
buyer is still positive.168 There is enough option value from 
merely arguing that the contract means strain 1 soybeans, in 
some states of the world, that the buyer still chooses to con-
tract. 
Third, new information related to the ambiguity must come 
to light before the option holder needs to invest in persuasion. 
If the contracting timeline in Figure 1 is switched such that the 
buyer must decide whether to accept delivery before informa-
tion on the state of nature is revealed, then the option is again 
destroyed. As described earlier, the die is cast, and the option 
holder has no way to adjust her decision based on new informa-
tion.169 
Fourth, the value of the option will increase as the holder 
grows more confident that her persuasion efforts will succeed, 
and especially if they will succeed when it matters the most. 
This turns, of course, on the plausibility of her preferred term—
 
static, the expected value of litigation for the bottom branch drops to $2.75: 
[($0.75 * 4) + ($0.25 * 3) – $1]. The buyer is better off lumping it and accepting 
the $3 payoff from strain 2. Even with this assumption, though, the option re-
tains value in the middle two branches (although not enough to induce the 
buyer to contract; the total expected value of the contract is –$0.12). Taking 
the example to its extreme, by dropping the payoff from strain 1 good news to 
$3 (the same as the payoff from strain 2 good news), the ambiguity is rendered 
meaningless to the buyer. 
 167. The expected value from litigation drops to ($2.25 – $3) = –$0.75 and 
the buyer simply accepts strain 1 in that state of nature. 
 168. The total expected value in this case is $0.07 per bushel. 
 169. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
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is it a particularly twisted interpretation of language, or one 
consistent with industry practice? In Figure 4, for example, re-
ducing the buyer’s perceived chance of success in litigation to 
25 percent drops the total contract value to –$0.15, while rais-
ing it to 90 percent increases the value to $0.35.170 
As alluded to earlier, the success of the option holder’s per-
suasion efforts may also depend on whether courts are willing 
to gap-fill and apply the indefiniteness doctrine loosely. Figure 
5 reconsiders the earlier example with a third possible outcome 
to litigation: the court strikes down the contract entirely for in-
definiteness, causing the buyer to receive nothing while still in-
curring the $1 cost of exercising the option.  
Figure 5.  Payoff to Buyer from Indefinite Contract with Litigation 
Option (Including 30% Probability of No Contract via Indefiniteness) 
 
It can quickly be seen that this is disastrous for the buyer: 
even a 30 percent chance of annulment, as illustrated, will wipe 
out most of the option value and prevent the buyer from con-
tracting. So courts must be willing to enforce vague contracts, 
at least some of the time, for embedded options to matter. 
 
 170. The break-even assumption here is a 44 percent perception of victory, 
so the buyer need not believe she will win a majority of the time in order to 
enter the contract, at least under these assumptions. 
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Greater use of the indefiniteness doctrine might severely limit 
the value of embedded options. 
Finally, transaction costs of contracting and the costs of 
the subsequent investment will affect the outcome. We might 
expect that contracting costs for vague contracts will be less 
than those for more detailed contracts.171 If so, there is an addi-
tional benefit from the ambiguity—although this bears no rela-
tion to the option value.172 The cost of the subsequent invest-
ment, however, will influence the significance of the embedded 
option—just as the strike price of a stock option determines an 
investor’s willingness to exercise it. If the investment cost 
vastly exceeds the likely benefit from a successful outcome, the 
option is way out of the money and worth little.173 Conversely, 
if investment costs decline relative to the potential payoff, then 
the embedded option’s value is magnified.174 
In summary, a number of factors must be present before 
meaningful option value arises. Theoretically this can certainly 
happen. How often these factors occur—and whether the re-
sulting options matter much—raise interesting empirical ques-
tions. 
4. Cognitive Limits to Pricing Embedded Interpretive Options 
Before turning to the economic impact of these options, it is 
important to raise one final point—the creation or cost of an 
embedded interpretive option may not be fully appreciated by 
both parties. This could be true for two primary reasons: a cog-
nitive failure to recognize the circumstances that give rise to 
the option, and a lack of information necessary to price the op-
tion accurately. Each problem is considered in turn. 
First, an embedded option will often be created without ex-
plicit negotiation over an ambiguous term, especially if the par-
ties remain silent with respect to the relevant contingency. 
Gaps can arise from many unexpected sources, and what is im-
portant to the option buyer may not even appear on the option 
seller’s radar. Because embedded interpretive options are  
 
 
 171. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 172. This difference can be seen in Figure 4 by simply reducing the costs of 
contracting below the $1 mark used in Figures 2 and 3. 
 173. To see this, increase the costs of litigation/persuasion in Figure 4 to 
$10. The option is rendered meaningless. 
 174. For example, dropping the litigation costs in Figure 4 to $0.10 boosts 
the buyer’s expected contract value to $0.40. 
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formed automatically under the right circumstances (ambiguity 
plus new information plus judicial willingness to fill gaps), 
there are reasons to believe that the option seller may not pay 
sufficient attention to the possibility of an embedded option—or 
even realize that she has written one. For instance, parties of-
ten make decisions based on simplifying patterns, or heuristics, 
that fail to take account of observations that are not readily 
apparent.175 We might therefore expect most parties to contract 
based on easily observable terms, while ignoring the potential 
of embedded options from less salient contractual gaps. 
There may be an important difference, then, between em-
bedded options from indefiniteness and more transparent op-
tions, such as those sold in an output or requirements contract. 
With the latter, the parties are more likely to be aware of the 
option-creating term and to have made an explicit or implicit 
deal to transfer the risk of greater or lower output to one 
side.176 With an embedded interpretive option, however, the op-
tion seller is forced to write the option because the other party 
can always mount unilateral claims about a contract’s “true” 
meaning if it is indefinite. The option seller may be much less 
likely to realize exactly what she is trading or the nature of the 
risk she accepts. 
Arguably, this lack of transparency should not matter, and 
any resulting option could still be considered part of an implicit 
deal between the parties. Certainly there is nothing inherently 
wrong with an embedded interpretive option, and it need not be 
a zero-sum transfer.177 And it is true that the option seller 
agrees to abide by an indefinite contract when she might have 
pushed to spell out the disputed term in more detail. In this 
 
 175. The pioneering articles in this field include Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) and Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). For 
more recent discussions of cognitive biases in the economic analysis of law, see 
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behav-
ioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000). 
 176. See Katz, supra note 115, at 2230–34; Scott & Triantis, supra note 
115, at 1429, 1454; Weistart, supra note 131, at 607–22. 
 177. The parties could conceivably convert any embedded option into an 
explicit option and trade the risk more transparently in a net-gain transaction. 
For example, the soybean farmer might offer to sell strain 1 soybeans for a 
certain price but retain the right to substitute strain 2 soybeans under certain 
circumstances. I thank Lee Fennell for this point. 
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sense, the seller could be viewed as acquiescing to any resulting 
interpretation that arises. 
But this may be a somewhat strained view of “contractual 
intent.” And it also takes us to the second problem: in the real 
world, an option seller may lack information necessary to price 
an embedded interpretive option accurately. As we have seen, 
the value of an embedded option will depend on a number of 
opaque factors, such as the buyer’s cost and confidence of suc-
cess in litigation, the underlying variability in the buyer’s 
valuation of different interpretations, and the likelihood that 
new, relevant information will emerge before performance is 
due.178 Option sellers may be hard-pressed to gather this in-
formation, or they may lack the cognitive skills to process it 
and price risk accurately if they can somehow derive esti-
mates.179 The problem thus parallels other models of informa-
tion asymmetry in contract law, but, arguably, the in-formation 
here is even further removed from the uninformed party.180 
Returning to the earlier example, the soybean seller may 
have no idea how confident a buyer is that she can convince the 
seller, or a court, that her preferred strain of soybeans should 
be delivered.181 If the buyer is confident, then a valuable option 
may be created. If not, no option arises. The same thing holds 
true of the underlying variability in the buyer’s valuation of dif-
ferent soybean strains. These facts, and other relevant buyer 
characteristics, may be unknown by the seller, and they have 
little reason to emerge during contract negotiations. 
Thus, cognitive biases and information asymmetries may 
preclude an option seller from realizing exactly what she is 
 
 178. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 179. The pricing of options can, after all, grow complicated rather quickly. 
In particular, volatility is the trickiest variable to calculate, and there are 
many alternative approaches. See HULL, supra note 111, at 206–07, 267–71; 
MUN, supra note 21, at 149–50. It may be too much to expect that options 
analysis will be used in most contractual settings, even between sophisticated 
commercial parties. 
 180. In one common model of contracting under asymmetrical information, 
the seller lacks information on a buyer’s valuation of a good. See, e.g., George 
S. Geis, Empirically Assessing Hadley v. Baxendale, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
897, 897–98 (2005). In the options context, however, it is not just the point 
valuation estimates for a population that matters, but rather the variability of 
valuations under different interpretations of an ambiguous term. This infor-
mation, along with data on the other relevant option pricing variables, may be 
even less transparent to a seller. 
 181. And, again, there may be reasons to believe that this will happen 
more often than it should. See Bar-Gill, supra note 158, at 203–10, 225–27. 
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trading or from accurately pricing the option. As a result, some 
people who get an option through vague language likely get it 
for free—or at a bargain rate—even though it imposes real 
costs that the other party would not have accepted without an 
adjustment elsewhere in the contract terms. This suggests that 
the creation of an embedded interpretive option may sometimes 
be problematic from an economic point of view. The next two 
sections consider this possibility more formally in relation to 
two core functions of contract law. 
C. THE IMPACT ON EFFICIENT TRADE 
A frequently stated goal of contract law is to support the 
transfer of goods and services to higher value users.182 If Ann 
values something $100 and Beth just $90, then the law should 
strive to get the good to Ann. This valuation diversity may 
come from different potential uses of the good, from different 
attitudes toward the risk of future price fluctuations, or from 
some other source.183 But whatever the basis, legal rules that 
hinder efficient trade should be viewed suspiciously from an 
economic perspective. 
Unfortunately, efficient trade may be distorted if the em-
bedded options created by indefinite contracts are ignored or 
underpriced due to the reasons just discussed. A seller might, 
for example, contract to sell goods even though the price that 
the seller “really” receives—when the buyer’s embedded option 
is taken into account—falls below the seller’s cost to produce. 
Conversely, a buyer may ignore embedded interpretive options 
garnered by a seller and purchase a product even though the 
price that the buyer “really” pays exceeds her valuation. 
Figure 6 considers the problem conceptually by presenting 
a simple supply and demand curve in a market with one buyer 
 
 182. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 15, at 1583 (“The goal of a system, meth-
odology, or doctrine of contract interpretation is to minimize transaction costs, 
broadly understood as obstacles to efforts voluntarily to shift resources to their 
most valuable use.”); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 17, at 544 (“[C]ontract law 
should facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to maximize the joint gains 
(the ‘contractual surplus’) from transactions.”). Of course, facilitating economic 
wealth maximization is not the undisputed normative goal of contract law. A 
rich literature offers various approaches for choosing between doctrinal alter-
natives grounded in morality, philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. 
See, e.g., BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 210–13 (3d ed. 
2004) (surveying some of these approaches). 
 183. See Craswell, supra note 52, at 488–89. 
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and one seller.184 The buyer is willing to purchase more of the 
good as prices drop. And the seller, facing a rising cost struc-
ture, is only willing to produce more if prices rise. The efficient 
contract occurs at P∗ and Q∗, where buyer and seller valuations 
meet. 
Figure 6.  Trade Distortion with Unperceived Buyer Option 
 
But if the seller ignores (or underprices) the cost of an em-
bedded option conferred on the buyer, then the seller will per-
ceive a supply curve that is shifted out (portrayed as the 
dashed line in Figure 6).185 In other words, he is willing to ac-
cept a lower price for any given level of quantity because he has 
discounted the creation of the option. The shift in supply means 
that buyer and seller agree instead to trade at Q’ and P’. An in-
efficient amount of trade takes place—where the buyer pur-
chases goods she values less than the seller—for the quantity 
between Q∗ and Q’, resulting in a net loss of social welfare, as 
illustrated by the shaded triangle in Figure 6. In essence, the 
buyer contracts to purchase goods that are not worth produc-
ing. 
 
 
 184. Anticompetitive effects are ignored in this analysis. 
 185. The figure portrays the option value as increasing disproportionately 
when the buyer holds a higher valuation of the goods; this outcome will be 
true under certain assumptions. Specifically, the analysis assumes that the 
other variables in the option-valuation model (volatility, interest rate, length 
of contract, and strike price) are held constant. Changing these assumptions 
might result in a different type of shift in the supply curve. As long as an em-
bedded option is created, however, some deadweight loss—as portrayed in 
Figure 6—will emerge. 
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Of course this tells only half of the story; the seller might 
also receive an embedded put option through contractual ambi-
guity. If this occurs—and if the buyer fails to comprehend or 
fully value the cost of the option—then the buyer’s willingness 
to purchase the goods will shift out (again portrayed in Figure 
7 as a dashed line). She will contract to buy the goods for too 
much because she ignores the fact that she has already paid 
something by writing the seller an option. Figure 7 illustrates 
the resulting equilibrium, which shows that a similar dead-
weight loss occurs as the seller produces goods exceeding the 
buyer’s valuation (the parties again trade at Q’ instead of Q∗). 
Figure 7.  Trade Distortion with Unperceived Seller Option 
 
And when embedded options are created for both buyer 
and seller, the problem can be compounded if each side fails to 
recognize the option they are writing. Both curves shift out, 
magnifying the deadweight loss. 
In summary, the creation of an embedded interpretive op-
tion will potentially cause inefficient trade in goods. Buyers 
and sellers may not adjust their purchase and production deci-
sions to take the embedded option value into account. This 
means that excessive trade may occur when sellers throw in an 
extra discount or buyers toss in an extra form of payment. If 
the price of the embedded option was transparent, there would 
be little concern. The supply and demand curves would simply 
adjust to reflect the value of the bundled good (asset plus op-
tion). But because option sellers are unlikely to be aware of—or 
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fully price—the option,186 each of these problems may result in 
an economic inefficiency. 
This is not the only concern. Another potentially significant 
distortion can arise through inefficient investment on the con-
tract. 
D. THE IMPACT ON EFFICIENT INVESTMENT 
A second important role of contract law is to enable parties 
to make efficient investments that increase the joint wealth 
created through trade.187 For example, a seller, having formed 
a deal to vend a large quantity of unique goods, may cut costs 
and decrease the chances of breach by purchasing special ma-
chinery to make the goods. Or a buyer may similarly gain by 
investing in reliance on the contract, perhaps by building facili-
ties next to the seller’s factory in order to reap inventory bene-
fits. Yet both investments will only pay off if the contract is 
honored; in economic terms, the investments are relation-
specific.188 Without the ability to make binding commitments, 
these specialized investments will not occur because each side 
will subject themselves to hold up renegotiation demands by 
the other.189 Both parties will suffer a net welfare loss because 
they cannot invest to increase the gains from trade.190 There-
fore contract law plays an important role in facilitating efficient 
investment by providing a mechanism for parties to inexorably 
bind themselves.191 
 
 186. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 187. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 205–10; Gergen, supra 
note 6, at 997; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 17, at 544. For more formal mod-
els that explore the efficient investment decision, see Lewis Kornhauser, Reli-
ance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON. 691, 691–706 
(1983). 
 188. Using an example of buyer investment, Craswell offers this definition 
of relation-specific investment: “[I]t is any choice, be it action or inaction, 
which will (1) make [seller’s] performance more valuable to [buyer] if [seller] 
does in fact perform, but (2) make [buyer] worse off than if he had not relied if 
[seller] fails to perform.” Craswell, supra note 52, at 490. 
 189. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 205–10; Craswell, supra note 
52, at 492. 
 190. Professors Schwartz and Scott discuss how contract law supports rela-
tion-specific investment and offer a helpful numerical example. See Schwartz 
& Scott, supra note 17, at 559–62. 
 191. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: 
An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). Doctrinal 
distortions of efficient investment decisions have also been explored in other 
contexts. For example, the award of expectation damages may cause parties to 
behave as if performance will occur with certainty, and thus they may ineffi-
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Unfortunately, the embedded options explored in this Arti-
cle also have the potential to distort the investment decisions of 
buyers and sellers. If the value of an embedded interpretive op-
tion is ignored or mispriced, then parties may choose to invest 
too little or too much on the contract. A seller, for example, may 
refuse to make efficient investments to minimize the likelihood 
of breach if he fails to take account of the buyer’s option value. 
Or a buyer may overinvest in reliance on a contract if she does 
not recognize a seller’s put option. 
This problem may be easier to comprehend with an exam-
ple, so let’s briefly return to the farm. Suppose that our soybean 
grower has contracted to sell his crops to a buyer under the 
same timeline depicted in Figure 1. Again, the buyer might 
demand strain 1 or strain 2 soybeans under an indefinite con-
tract. And she will receive new information impacting the rela-
tive value of the different soybean strains before performance is 
due, thus creating a qualified embedded option to receive legal 
entitlement to her preferred term.192 Suppose further that the 
creation of this option increases the value of the contract to the 
buyer from 10 to 20, but that cognitive limits prevent the seller 
from recognizing the option. 
The seller is now considering an investment where he 
would build a small harvesting facility near the buyer’s ware-
house. The investment is relation-specific, such that it will only 
reduce the likelihood of breach for this specific buyer. Table 1 
assigns some hypothetical numbers (on a per bushel of soy-
beans basis) to the investment. 
Table 1: Potential Seller Investment 
Investment Cost Chance of 
Breach 
Perceived 
Damage 
Actual 
Damage 
None 0 40% 10 20 
Building 3 20% 10 20 
Given these assumptions, how will the farmer invest? In 
general, he will seek to minimize his expected cost of perform-
ance, which is a function of investment expense, the probability 
of successful performance, and the damages for breach. If the 
 
ciently overinvest in reliance on the contract. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 
16, at 206–08; Posner, supra note 1, at 834–36. 
 192. As explained earlier, the option is qualified in the sense that no party 
may exercise it with certainty. Rather, an additional investment in persuasion 
or litigation buys a chance at obtaining a legal entitlement to one’s preferred 
term. 
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seller could recognize the embedded option, he would weigh the 
cost of investment against the incremental gains and choose to 
invest (20 * .2 + 3 < 20 * .4 + 0).193 This is the efficient choice 
because the investment will increase the overall gains from 
trade when the buyer’s full valuation is taken into account. 
But if the seller ignores or underprices the buyer’s option—
such that the seller perceives the cost of breach at just 10—
then the existence of the embedded option will change the re-
sult. Now, the seller will compare the costs of investing against 
the perceived gains and forego the efficient investment (10 * .2 
+ 3 > 10 * .4 + 0). The seller fails to take worthwhile invest-
ments to reduce the probability of breach because he underes-
timates what the contract is worth to the buyer. 
More generally, a seller’s full range of investments might 
be modeled as a continuum of expenditures that reduce the 
probability of breach.194 As Figure 8 illustrates, the cost of per-
formance will typically fall as the seller makes some invest-
ment in precautions and then rise again when incremental pre-
cautions start to cost more than they save in liability. 
Figure 8.  Seller Precautions with Embedded Option 
 
The efficient seller will thus optimize at I∗, where he mini-
mizes total expected costs. But if the seller excludes the em-
 
 193. This formula and Figure 8 are adapted from COOTER & ULEN, supra 
note 16, at 300. The seller cost function might be portrayed as follows: (cost of 
the precaution investment) + (probability of breach * damages from breach). 
Id. 
 194. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 300–03. Alternatively, seller 
investments may be modeled as expenditures that reduce the cost of comply-
ing with the contract. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 17, at 559–62. 
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bedded option, then he will perceive the cost of breach as too 
low (portrayed as the dashed curve in Figure 8) and ineffi-
ciently underinvest in precautions at I’. 
The analysis is very similar for buyer investment on a con-
tract when a seller put option is created. Putting aside the em-
bedded option for a moment, a buyer will normally invest to 
maximize expected profits, which are typically a function of the 
investment cost, the payoff from the investment when the con-
tract is performed, and the damages awarded for breach.195 As 
Figure 9 illustrates, investment will generally rise until the 
marginal cost of investment exceeds the marginal benefits—
this optimal level of investment is labeled I∗ in the figure. Be-
low I∗, the buyer foregoes sound investments; above it, the 
buyer experiences negative returns to the investment dollar.196 
Figure 9.  Buyer Investment with Embedded Option 
 
But if the buyer fails to recognize that she is also writing 
an option for the seller, then she will make her investment de-
cision using the perceived profit curve (shown as the dashed 
curve in Figure 9). The buyer will now invest at I’, above the ef-
ficient amount, because her expected profit function is dis-
torted.197 Explained differently, ignoring embedded options can 
 
 195. This figure and analytical framework is again adapted from COOTER & 
ULEN, supra note 16, at 303–05. As the authors describe, the expected profit 
function facing the buyer can be written: (probability of performance * buyer 
revenues with performance) + (probability of breach * damages with breach) – 
(investment cost). Id. at 303. 
 196. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of 
Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1985). 
 197. The effects are thus similar to the problems that may arise from the 
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lead to investments that have a negative net present value be-
cause they overestimate what the contract is really worth to 
the buyer. 
In summary, this means that contract law faces a tricky 
problem. Indefinite contracts, combined with new information 
and judicial gap filling, can give rise to an embedded option. 
This, in turn, may lead to inefficient levels of trade or invest-
ment if cognitive biases or informational asymmetries prevent 
both parties from recognizing the option. It also suggests that 
too many vague contracts will be formed, or that too many law-
suits will be filed on the back end, to pursue a preferred-term 
entitlement. The remainder of this Article, then, focuses on the 
next logical question: is there anything that contract law—and 
the indefiniteness doctrine, in particular—can do to mitigate 
these distortions? 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDEFINITENESS 
DOCTRINE 
A. FORMAL INDEFINITENESS DOCTRINE? 
It is tempting to conclude that courts should reinstate a 
formal version of the indefiniteness doctrine—one that brooks 
no ambiguity. Since embedded options are a function of judicial 
gap filling and sometimes cause inefficiencies, why not simply 
police and annul all indefinite agreements? A formal approach 
would force parties to enunciate the terms of their agreements, 
obliterating options from ambiguity and the resulting economic 
distortions.198 
But such a hard-line notion of the indefiniteness doctrine 
presents its own concerns. First, an obvious flaw in this argu-
ment is that all contracts will retain some ambiguity because 
parties can never spell out the implications of every remote 
contingency.199 Nor would we want them to—the transaction 
 
use of expectation damages. See supra note 191. 
 198. Judge Cardozo appears to endorse such an approach in the famous 
case of Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 
N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923). In that case, he explicitly considers and rejects the 
temptation to fill an ambiguous contract term (related to the length of the con-
tract) because this would have given rise to a series of options for the buyer. 
Id. at 471. For a more detailed analysis of the case, see Lawrence A. Cunning-
ham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379, 
1393–95 (1995). 
 199. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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costs would eat up any benefits from trade. Taking a formal in-
definiteness doctrine to its extreme, then, would undermine the 
sanctity of contract because all deals could be unwound. 
In fact, overuse of the indefiniteness doctrine might give 
rise to another embedded option problem. A party would honor 
a deal if it later proved convenient, but raise a remote ambigu-
ity to cancel it for indefiniteness if events change and he no 
longer wished to be bound. Under this logic, then, either side 
might have an embedded option to annul a contract for indefi-
niteness. This option to cancel would, most likely, be recognized 
by both parties, and they would be unwilling to make relation-
specific investments and unable to enjoy other benefits of con-
tractual certainty. This point parallels, of course, a problem 
that can arise with other defenses to contract formation—such 
as incapacity, illegality, and the like—if they extend too far.200 
And even if these concerns can be managed—perhaps with 
a balancing approach, which I will return to shortly—the costs 
of embedded option distortions still need to be balanced against 
the gains from gap filling. After all, gap filling and judicial in-
terpretation can play a valuable, efficiency-enhancing role by 
reducing the transaction costs of contracting.201 Reinstating an 
overly formal indefiniteness doctrine may therefore swing the 
pendulum too far the other way. 
An optimal approach to indefiniteness, then, might go be-
yond an all-or-nothing attitude and take on these concerns di-
rectly in an attempt to get the balance right. 
B. PRO-DEFENDANT GAP FILLERS 
A recent article by Omri Ben-Shahar seizes upon the di-
chotomous nature of the indefiniteness doctrine and offers a 
middle-ground solution in the form of “pro-defendant gap fill-
ers.”202 Under this approach, when parties deliberately fail to 
reach consensus on some issues, courts would neither toss out a 
contract nor uphold it with judicially imposed terms.203 Instead, 
courts would give each party the right to enforce a partially de-
lineated agreement—but only with the ambiguous terms 
 
 200. See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deter-
rence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116–23 
(1988). 
 201. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. 
 202. Ben-Shahar, supra note 22, at 390. 
 203. See id. at 391–92. 
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skewed to favor the other side.204 If everything is agreed upon 
except form of payment, for example, a seller could enforce the 
deal for generous credit terms, and a buyer could enforce it for 
cash.205 Pro-defendant gap fillers might allow parties to secure 
a partial commitment, while still giving them freedom to veto 
judicially imposed terms in the face of purposeful ambiguity.206 
If successfully implemented, a pro-defendant gap-filling 
approach might also mitigate the problems arising from the 
embedded options explored in this Article. Parties would no 
longer have incentives to leave their agreements intentionally 
vague to garner an option, because they would lose any chance 
of legal entitlement to their preferred term down the line. In 
other words, pro-defendant gap fillers would destroy embedded 
options by taking away flexibility to argue that an indefinite 
term means what you want it to mean after uncertainties lift. 
Without this option value, then, the economic distortions ex-
plored earlier should be alleviated. 
It is easy to see how pro-defendant gap fillers could quash 
an option by returning to the example depicted in Figure 4. As-
suming that courts determine whether a term is pro-plaintiff at 
the time of litigation—and not when a contract is initially 
formed—then this approach would drop the chances of success-
ful litigation to zero.207 The buyer in Figure 4 will only be able 
to enforce the agreement for less profitable soybeans—strain 1 
in the second branch of the decision tree and strain 2 in all 
other branches—and there will be no reason to incur the costs 
of exercising the option. The ultimate effect should be to force 
parties to explicitly spell out value-enhancing options. 
But the trick, as usual, lies in the implementation. A judge 
would need to determine when to use pro-defendant gap fillers. 
 
 204. See id. at 411–20. 
 205. Id. at 390. As Professor Ben-Shahar explains: “[I]f a buyer and seller 
agree on many provisions but leave others, such as payment terms, ‘to be 
agreed upon,’ then each party should be able to enforce a deal supplemented 
by payment terms that are most favorable to the other party.” Id. 
 206. See id. at 392. 
 207. It is possible that courts might determine whether a term was pro-
plaintiff by looking back to the time of contracting to see what term was most 
likely to benefit the plaintiff. But such an approach is undesirable for two rea-
sons. First, it would allow plaintiffs to argue for some terms that may not have 
been pro-plaintiff at the time of contracting but are now due to new informa-
tion (for example, branch 2 in Figure 4). Second, this approach is likely to re-
quire greater judicial resources; instead of looking at the pleadings and impos-
ing the defendant’s requested term, the court would need to assess the impact 
of various terms on the plaintiff at the time of contracting. 
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If they are only used some of the time—and there are reasons 
to believe that majoritarian defaults or penalty defaults might 
be appropriate for some ambiguities208—then an option may 
still emerge from the chance that a favorable gap filler will 
again be imposed. The contest just takes place one step further 
up the analytical chain, as courts wrestle with what default 
standard to apply, and whether parties purposefully intended a 
term to be vague or just sought a majoritarian gap filler to save 
transaction costs. Another possible challenge may be determin-
ing whether a term is really pro-defendant.209 As seen earlier in 
this Article, the same term might be pro-defendant in one con-
text but pro-plaintiff in another—all depending on how future 
uncertainties are resolved.210 A third question is whether in-
creased administrative costs would be worth the trouble. 
On balance, though, pro-defendant gap fillers do offer an 
intriguing middle-ground approach with the potential to elimi-
nate, or at least reduce, economic distortions that may arise 
from the cognitive limits on pricing embedded interpretive op-
tions.  
C. EFFICIENT INVESTMENT IN CONTRACTUAL SPECIFICITY 
A third possible approach to the indefiniteness problem is 
to focus directly on whether parties have made efficient upfront 
investments in contractual specificity. A court would strike 
down the contract for indefiniteness if there were low-cost, veri-
fiable metrics that the parties could have seized upon during 
the contracting stage to define their obligations more precisely. 
Conversely, a court would uphold the agreement, gap filling as 
necessary, if there were good reasons why a deal was not de-
lineated with precision. This might include agreements where 
the indefiniteness involved a low probability event, or an im-
portant, but unverifiable, term. In other words, courts would 
shift the analysis to an explicit consideration of the parties’ 
choices about formation costs. 
Over time, greater and more explicit use of the indefinite-
ness doctrine in this manner might reduce the economic distor-
tions outlined in this Article. Courts would still plug gaps in 
 
 208. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 22, at 391–92 (describing how the selec-
tion of a majoritarian, penalty, or pro-defendant gap-filling standard should 
depend on the underlying reason for the contractual incompleteness). 
 209. Id. at 413–14, 418–20. 
 210. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
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indefinite contracts, but the resulting distortions from interpre-
tive options may be less problematic for two reasons. First, 
much of the gap filling would occur for remote contingencies or 
unimportant terms, where meaningful option value is unlikely 
to arise.211 Second, the agreements most likely to result in sig-
nificant embedded options—those with a purposeful ambiguity 
that could have easily been resolved upfront—would face a 
greater chance of judicial invalidation, cutting back the eco-
nomic distortions from the option.212 
There are at least two other potential benefits to this ap-
proach. First, it might still lead to systemic transaction-cost 
savings because courts would be willing to gap-fill for low prob-
ability contingencies. This would leave parties free to draft a 
bare-bones agreement as long as they detailed the most impor-
tant, verifiable terms and were comfortable with the legal de-
faults for the rest of the terms. Second, the fact that judges 
would strike down deals when parties fail to make adequate, 
up-front investments in specificity might prevent parties from 
externalizing contracting costs to the courts.213 Addressing the 
root cause of the indefiniteness, then, might be a way to both 
preserve the gains and excise the costs of gap filling. 
And while this approach would undoubtedly be difficult to 
implement, there is evidence that some courts already take 
these factors into account. Recall that Robert Scott’s empirical 
work on indefiniteness cases concluded that there was no ap-
parent link between invalidation for indefiniteness and the 
subject of the transaction (goods covered by the U.C.C. versus 
services) or the jurisdiction where the case was heard (states 
favoring a common law approach versus those favoring a looser 
U.C.C.-based approach).214 But he did find that courts seem to 
“focus on whether the parties have fully exploited verifiable in-
formation in concluding their agreements.”215 Where the con-
tract is incomplete because a contingency is remote or a term 
unverifiable, then courts have often filled the gap. And con-
tracts that are left vague, when a verifiable term could have 
 
 211. See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text. 
 212. As an earlier example showed, even slight increases in the probability 
that the indefiniteness doctrine will be used can cut option value and assuage 
economic distortions. See supra Figure 5 and accompanying discussion. 
 213. See Posner, supra note 59, at 9–12. 
 214. Scott, supra note 8, at 1653–55. 
 215. Id. at 1654. 
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been included at a low cost, often seem to be annulled.216 So 
some courts may already be undertaking this analysis, at least 
implicitly. 
One other downside of this approach, beyond the judicial 
administrative burden, is the fact that it still represents an all-
or-nothing attitude to indefiniteness. As seen earlier, there 
might be good reasons to allow parties to purposefully bind 
themselves to some partial agreement—without a need to spell 
out every important, verifiable term.217 This approach would 
not allow such freedom. 
Of course the problem is—and has always been—where to 
draw the line. Commentators studying the indefiniteness doc-
trine have repeatedly cautioned that courts should not make 
agreements for parties who can do so themselves.218 Option 
theory underscores the dangers by explicitly showing economic 
costs to excessive gap filling. A perfect solution probably re-
quires a theory of optimal specificity, which raises fundamental 
issues related to rules versus standards.219 Lacking that, courts 
may need to undertake a case-by-case analysis that asks 
whether parties made appropriate up-front investments in 
specificity—or at least explores why they left an agreement in-
definite. For this reason, a bright-line rule for the indefinite-
ness doctrine is unlikely to be very helpful. 
CONCLUSION 
The study of contract law over the past few decades has 
been, to a great extent, the study of default rules. Following in 
the tradition of legal realists, many commentators have called 
for comprehensive gap-filling provisions that allow courts to 
honor contractual intentions and enforce agreements that are 
“complete enough.” Much of the work emphasizes how gap fill-
ing can grease the gears of trade. 
 
 216. See supra note 75. 
 217. See supra Part III.B. 
 218. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 219. For greater discussion of rules versus standards in the contracts con-
text, see Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics 
and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903 (2003); Katz, supra 
note 1; Scott & Triantis, supra note 13. On the rules versus standards issue 
more generally, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative 
Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–1713 
(1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). 
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But there is an underexplored cost to this approach. Con-
tractual ambiguity, coupled with ardent judicial gap filling, can 
create an embedded option because a party is free to argue uni-
laterally for her preferred interpretation as uncertainties clear. 
This Article has demonstrated how parties may set their pur-
chase and production decisions without taking this embedded 
interpretive option into account, undermining important goals 
of contract law. Inefficient trade may occur as buyers contract 
for goods that are not worth producing or sellers make products 
that exceed buyer’s valuations. Or inefficient investments may 
be pursued when option value is ignored. In short, there are 
distortions in the shadow of judicial gap filling. 
Unfortunately, there may be no one-size-fits-all solution. 
Formal use of the indefiniteness doctrine to strike down vague 
contracts might help, but this could lead to new problems as 
well. Pro-defendant gap fillers are a possibility. A perfect solu-
tion requires, perhaps, a theory of optimal specificity, which 
raises complex jurisprudential issues related to the fundamen-
tal tradeoff between rules and standards. In the meantime, 
courts may wish to explicitly ask why contracts have been left 
vague—striking down bare-bones agreements that could have 
easily specified an important term—and continue to recognize 
that the indefiniteness doctrine has a meaningful role to play in 
contract law. 
